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The Compatibility of Forward-Looking and  





This Article is the first to argue that forward-looking and backward-
looking accounts of tort law are intrinsically compatible with one another.  
This theoretical point is of great importance and will bring about a paradigm 
shift in tort theory—and, more generally, in legal theory.  This is because the 
long-standing debate between corrective justice theorists and economic 
theorists about the purpose of tort law (with active participants including 
Posner, Calabresi, Coleman, Weinrib, Rawls, and countless others) is based 
on the universal assumption that forward-looking and backward-looking 
accounts of tort law are incompatible.  This assumption, however, is false, 
and this Article explains why it is false and how so many other authors have 
gone wrong.   
The contribution of this Article, however, is not limited to this theoretical 
point—it also makes important contributions in the practical domain.  The 
practical implications of the theoretical point are great and threefold: First, 
removing the forward-looking / backward-looking non-issue from the table 
will allow us to refocus our efforts on the all-important and complex question 
of what the substantive legal standard of behavior should be.  Second, 
recognition of the reason for the compatibility between the forward-looking 
and backward-looking aspects of tort law itself provides us with newfound 
insight into which factors are relevant to our determination of the best 
substantive legal standard.  Third, this recognition of the reason for 
compatibility not only aids us in the determination of the best substantive 
legal standard now, but it provides us with an understanding of what 
practical changes we can make to improve society’s welfare going forward.   
In sum, in addition to this Article providing groundbreaking theoretical 
conclusions, it also offers practical guidance and positive proposals, both of 
                                                
*  B.A., Philosophy, Stanford University, 2006; M.A., Philosophy, Stanford 
University, 2006; J.D., Stanford Law School, 2010; Ph.D. Candidate, Philosophy, 
University of Southern California, 2017; Law Clerk to the Honorable Robert E. 
Bacharach, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 2016-2017; Law 
Clerk to the Honorable Nicholas G. Garaufis, United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of New York, 2017-2018.  I owe great thanks to Greg Keating, 
Barbara Fried, John Gardner, Gary Watson, and Kimberly Ferzan, each of whom has 
commented on earlier drafts of this Article.  I also owe thanks to audiences at the 
following conferences, where I presented earlier drafts of this Article: the 3rd Annual 
UCLA Graduate Conference in Law and Philosophy, the 65th Northwest Philosophy 
Conference, and the Ontario Legal Philosophy Partnership Graduate Conference for 
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which are capable of having a tangible—and substantial—impact on 
society’s welfare.  
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When a judge decides a case in tort law, the results can be twofold: First, 
the dispute between the litigants is resolved, and second, a change may be 
made to the law of torts that will affect all future behavior of individuals who 
live their lives in the shadow of the law.1  While sometimes this change may 
be dramatic, in the vast majority of cases, this change may appear trifling or 
insignificant—a minor clarification here, added support for an already well-
entrenched principle there.  Indeed, even when no change is made, that itself 
can be significant.  All of these cases constitute additions to the ever-
growing ball of wax that is the common law.  
Tort law adjudication is not unique with regard to its dual effects.  In all 
common law disciplines,2 the judiciary knows that what it says will 
simultaneously have backward-looking and forward-looking results.  This 
much is clear.  What is less clear is how judges do decide and should decide 
tort cases, in light of the dual effects that will result, and this question is the 
subject of heated academic debate. 
Two main camps have historically dominated this debate, and while 
there have been some new variations to arrive on the scene recently,3 the 
debate remains largely polarized between these two camps—corrective 
                                                
1  Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. was among the first to write about this concept.  
According to Holmes, despite the differences between a good man and “the bad 
man,” we all bargain in the shadow of the law.  See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The 
Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 460 (1897). 
2  This Article will argue, in Part VI, that—despite popular belief to the 
contrary—this phenomenon in fact is not unique to common law disciplines. 
3  See e.g., Scott Hershovitz, Harry Potter and the Trouble with Tort Theory, 63 
STAN. L. REV. 67 (2010); Gregory Keating, The Priority of Respect Over Repair, 18 
LEGAL THEORY 293 (2012); Benjamin Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective 
Justice, 91 GEO. L. J. 695 (2003).  For critical commentary on Zipursky’s civil 
recourse theory, see generally Richard Posner, Instrumental and Noninstrumental 
Theories of Tort Law, 88 IND. L. J. 469 (2013); Christopher J. Robinette, Why Civil 
Recourse Theory Is Incomplete, 78 TENN. L. REV. 431 (2011); Michael Rustad, Torts 
as Public Wrongs, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 433 (2011). 
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justice theorists and economic theorists.  Ostensibly at issue in this debate is 
the question of what is the “fundamental” principle4 or sovereign principle5 
of tort law, what tort law at its “core” seeks to do,6 or what tort law is “really 
about.”7  On the one hand, economic theorists of tort law think that tort law 
is and should be forward-looking, and that it aims to maximize economic 
efficiency.  On the other hand, the corrective justice theorists think that tort 
law is and should be backward-looking and that its goal is to repair wrongful 
losses.  
This Article will argue that this long-standing debate between corrective 
justice theorists and economic theorists is rife with confusion and is based on 
a false assumption.  This assumption—which both camps mistakenly 
make—is that forward-looking and backward-looking accounts of tort law 
are not compatible with one another.  Forward-looking and backward-
looking accounts of tort law are compatible with one another, however, and 
the first main goal of this Article will be to explain why we should believe 
this theoretical claim.  Doing so will, in part, involve explaining how so 
many other authors have gone wrong.  
The second main goal of this Article will then be to explore the 
implications of accepting this theoretical point.  The implications are great, 
and at least threefold: First, the debate about the forward-looking and 
backward-looking aspects of tort law has partially obscured the all-important 
and complex question of what the substantive legal standard of behavior 
should be.  Removing the forward-looking / backward-looking non-issue 
from the table will allow us to refocus our efforts on this important and 
challenging topic.  Second, recognition of the reason for the compatibility 
between the forward-looking and backward-looking aspects of tort law itself 
provides us with newfound insight into which factors are relevant to our 
determination of the best substantive legal standard.  Third, this recognition 
of the reason for compatibility not only aids us in the determination of the 
best substantive legal standard now, but it provides us with an understanding 
of what practical changes we can make to improve society’s welfare going 
forward.  
Thus, this Article makes important contributions in both the theoretical 
and practical domains: First, it makes theoretical points that will bring about 
a paradigm shift in tort theory—and, more generally, in legal theory.  
Second, it offers practical guidance and positive proposals, both of which are 
capable of having a tangible—and substantial—impact on society’s welfare.  
Part I begins by describing the economists’ view and the corrective 
justice theorists’ view and it explains where precisely the tensions between 
                                                
4 Jules Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 53 (David G. Owen ed., 1995).  
5  Id. at 62.  
6  JULES COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE 9, 36 (2001). 
7  Zipursky, supra note 3, at 724.  




the two views lie.  It also explains how the two camps argue against one 
another and what they find unpalatable about the other view.  Interestingly, 
however, what is unpalatable about one camp’s view to the other, and vice 
versa, is not so much an intrinsic feature of the other view, but rather, the 
fact that following the other view would at least sometimes lead one to not 
adhere to the prescriptions of one’s own view.  Further, it seems that in cases 
where the two theories yield the same prescription, many proponents of one 
theory would likely at least find the goal of the other theory to be a collateral 
benefit of deciding the case in accordance with one’s favored theory.  In 
light of this, one clear assumption made by both camps is that there would in 
fact be at least some cases where following the prescriptions of one theory is 
incompatible with following the prescriptions of the other.  Part I identifies 
this assumption and calls into question its truth.  Further, it provides some 
preliminary reasons to think that the assumption is in fact false.  Thus, Part I 
suggests that there is reason to think that—due to a key, and almost 
universal, misstep—the debate between the two camps is misguided, and that 
corrective justice theory is in fact compatible with the economic theory of 
tort law.  As such, Part I presents a hypothesis that merits further and more 
in-depth exploration. 
While in the literature on tort it is a forgone conclusion that forward-
looking and backward-looking accounts of tort are incompatible, this is a 
generalization, and, as just stated, this potential misstep is only almost 
universal.  Two exceptions do exist: Richard Posner and John Rawls.  Posner 
and Rawls both think that forward-looking and backward-looking accounts 
can in fact be compatible—for related, but different reasons.  Part II 
describes and analyzes the positions that Posner and Rawls offer, but 
concludes that neither one provides an account that satisfactorily shows that 
forward-looking and backward-looking accounts of tort are compatible. 
According to Posner, it is plausible to maintain that forward-looking and 
backward-looking accounts of tort law are compatible, but according to 
Posner, the backward-looking aspect of tort law is merely instrumentally 
valuable.8  It merely is part of the machinery that enables us to achieve, 
through incentive effects on future behavior, what is of intrinsic value—
efficient results for the future.  Rawls offers a different account, but one 
which similarly holds that the reason for having law and for deciding what in 
fact should be a law is only that the system of law in general, and any 
specific law in particular, is of intrinsic value in the forward-looking sense.9 
According to corrective justice theorists, however, the backward-looking 
aspect of tort law is of intrinsic value and is a (or the) reason for having the 
system of tort law and for having a particular action be tortious.  Thus, Part 
II argues that, though both Posner and Rawls attempt to describe accounts 
that would render forward-looking and backward-looking accounts of the 
                                                
8  See infra Part II.A. 
9  See infra Part II.B. 
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law compatible and satisfy both camps, they both fail in this attempt.  
Corrective justice theorists would not be willing to sign onto either Posner’s 
or Rawls’s accounts. 
Part III argues that, despite Posner’s and Rawls’s failed attempts, and 
despite the rest of the literature’s failure to even make an attempt, forward-
looking and backward-looking accounts of tort law are in fact compatible.  It 
proceeds as follows: Part III begins by clarifying and analyzing the very 
meaning of the terms “forward-looking” and “backward-looking.”  In order 
to assess the truth of the compatibility claim, we must first be sure that we 
understand precisely what we mean when we say that the forward-looking 
aspect of tort law is of intrinsic value or that the backward-looking aspect is 
of intrinsic value.  As it happens, neither term is as straightforward as it 
seems, and there has been much confusion on this score.  Next, Part III flags 
a way in which many (if not most) authors have gone astray in debating the 
compatibility of forward-looking and backward-looking accounts of tort law.  
In attempts to show the incompatibility of the forward-looking and 
backward-looking aspects of the law itself, many authors have, instead, 
mistakenly pointed to cases of potential divergence between forward-looking 
and backward-looking aspects of a government or legal system on the whole.  
This is a mistake because it is orthogonal to the question of compatibility 
between the two accounts of the law itself.  Part III will illustrate this fallacy 
by describing and analyzing scapegoating—the example most commonly 
used in these mistaken arguments.  
Having laid this groundwork, Part III then delves into the core of the 
issue.  It argues that the relevant question is whether the forward-looking and 
backward-looking accounts would be compatible if we hold fixed substantive 
notions of wrongful conduct within the two accounts respectively.  In other 
words, suppose that behavior that an individual thinks is wrongful and 
meriting backward-looking redress in tort is also the type of behavior the 
avoidance of which he thinks should constitute societal goals going forward.  
Part III argues that, whatever our substantive notion of wrongful conduct 
might be, holding people liable for this conduct (and thus bringing about 
backward-looking intrinsic value) would also be the way to best deter future 
wrongful conduct (and thus bring about forward-looking intrinsic value).  
Nevertheless, even if this theoretical compatibility claim is true, it could 
be the case, as a practical matter, that people—be they self-proclaimed 
corrective justice theorists, economists, or others—do not, as a matter of fact, 
subscribe to the same substantive views for both the forward-looking and 
backward-looking aspects of tort law.  If this were the case, and an 
individual had two different substantive views for the two different aspects 
of tort, this would suggest that tort law would not simultaneously be able to 
fully coincide with such an individual’s forward-looking and backward-
looking views.  For such a person, then, it would seem as though a question 
would arise as to whether tort law should be an institution that seeks to 




further forward-looking value or backward-looking value, or some mix of 
the two.  Part IV thus examines the most plausible candidate substantive 
views and explores whether it is plausible to maintain either of them as the 
substantive notion for both components of one’s forward-looking / 
backward-looking view pair.  Part IV concludes that it does not currently 
seem to be plausible to hold any of the substantive notions for both one’s 
forward-looking and backward-looking view.  
With these quasi-descriptive conclusions in hand, and after showing that 
the practical divergence in fact is much smaller than we might think, Part V 
shifts gears and confronts normative questions: Is it good that this is the way 
things are?  And if the current state of affairs is not ideal, what—if 
anything—might we be able to do to improve the situation?  It argues that 
the answer to the former is that while the status quo is not bad, we would be 
better off if our substantive notion of wrongfulness were brought into even 
closer alignment with our substantive notion of societal goals.  It then 
considers various approaches that can be taken to eliminate the divergence 
and bring about not only theoretical compatibility but also practical 
compatibility between forward-looking and backward-looking accounts of 
tort.  Part V argues that this is in fact a possibility and it offers practical 
proposals for how to carry out a transformation project of this sort.          
Part VI argues that, despite the fact that the forward-looking / backward-
looking debate ostensibly arises in the context of tort, and, more generally, 
the common law, it is a mistake—on reflection—for one to hold this view.  
Thus, it argues that the issues arising in the statutory context and the 
common law context are, contrary to popular belief, very similar and almost 
identical.  Lastly, the Conclusion offers some parting thoughts.  
An important final note before proceeding: The theoretical compatibility 
claim itself thus turns out to be of both instrumental and intrinsic value.10  
The instrumental importance: If it weren’t for its truth, the possibility of 
bringing about the practical convergence that the Article proposes would not 
even exist.  This convergence would be valuable—and thus the theoretical 
claim is of instrumental value.  The intrinsic importance: Even if the above-
mentioned practical convergence were not possible, it is an important 
revelation that the forward-looking and backward-looking aspects of tort are 
theoretically compatible, because it shows that authors have been grossly 
mistaken both about what precisely is at issue in the debate and about where 
the action lies in tort law theory.  As such, this discovery will bring about 
substantially greater clarity and, hopefully, reorient tort scholarship on the 
whole to ensure that it is looking—so to speak—in fruitful directions. 
 
                                                
10  Strictly speaking, both of these points relate to instrumental value, but one is 
considerably more direct, and thus can loosely be described as having intrinsic value.  
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I. THE DEBATE BETWEEN ECONOMISTS AND CORRECTIVE JUSTICE 
THEORISTS 
 
A. The Economic Theory 
 
According to the traditional economic view, tort is a forward-looking 
institution whose only goal is to provide the correct incentives to bring about 
maximally efficient behavior by people in society in the future.11  Thus, 
economists generally do not think of tort law in terms of obligations or in 
terms of responsibility for harm, but rather, in terms of the minimization of 
future costs.  As Guido Calabresi famously said, “I take it as axiomatic that 
the principal function of accident law is to reduce the sum of the costs of 
accidents and the costs of avoiding accidents.”12  More specifically, 
economists generally think that the way to reduce these costs is by placing 
liability on the “cheapest cost-avoider”—the party best equipped to take the 
appropriate precautionary measures.13  Thus, economists think that tort 
plaintiffs should recover when they can show that a judgment for the plaintiff 
would promote the social interest going forward.  Further, economists think 
that there should be no judgment for a plaintiff unless a judgment will 
minimize accident costs going forward, because the cost of the accident in a 
case being litigated is now sunk, and simply holding the defendant 
responsible to the plaintiff for that cost will not minimize that cost.14  Thus, 
notwithstanding the fact that courts ostensibly make their decisions in 
language of “duty,” “breach,” and “proximate cause,” economists think that 
courts often are—and most certainly should always be—deciding cases by 
engaging in a forward-looking cost-benefit analysis.    
In sum, there are two key components of the traditional economic view, 
and each component consists of both a normative and a descriptive portion: 
First, the law should be forward-looking and the law is forward-looking.15  
Second, in looking forward, what we should seek to do is maximize 
economic efficiency, and, in looking forward, what we do do is maximize 
economic efficiency.16   
Interestingly, however, Posner himself has changed his view over the 
years, and, instead of espousing a forward-looking view that seeks to 
maximize economic efficiency (i.e., maximize wealth), he now espouses a 
forward-looking view that seeks to maximize happiness.17  Furthermore, 
                                                
11  See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970). 
12  Id. at 26. 
13  Id. 
14  Id. at 27. 
15  See generally id. 
16  See generally id. 
17 See generally Richard Posner, Wealth Maximization and Tort Law: a 
Philosophical Inquiry, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW  (David G. 




Posner was not alone in making this shift, and the forward-looking 
happiness-based view is the typical view shared by the law and economics 
movement today.18  In many cases, wealth is still used instrumentally as a 
stand-in for happiness, be it as a proxy or for one of various other reasons 
why it might be a good intermediate aim.  Despite this theoretical change, 
however, the practical differences between the traditional view and the 
current view are not quite as great as one might think.  This is because the 
economists in most cases see the cheapest-unhappiness-avoider as being the 
party that is the cheapest cost-avoider.  Furthermore, the shift in the 
economists’ view has not really brought about a change in the debate 
between economists and corrective justice theorists—and this is not due to 
the fact that the economists’ shift has not brought about a large practical shift 
to their view, because even if it had, the new view would still diverge from 
the corrective justice view in the same respects in which the traditional view 
did.  Both economic views disagree with corrective justice views on the 
forward-looking / backward-looking issue and on the substantive question of 
what our societal goals should be. 
In the remainder of this Article, the position that will be attributed to the 
economist is the happiness-based view—both because it is the most up-to-
date version of the economists’ view and because it is a more plausible 
version.  The term “efficiency,” however, is often used by authors both to 
refer to economic efficiency and to happiness-based efficiency, and thus this 
term could create confusion.  So as to avoid this, this Article will—from 
hereon out—use the term “efficiency” to refer to happiness-based efficiency, 
unless explicitly stated otherwise. 
 
B. The Corrective Justice Theory 
 
The “corrective justice” approach to tort law is the other main lens 
through which tort law is viewed.  Corrective justice does not refer to a 
single approach, but rather to a family of similar views.19  Among others, 
proponents of corrective justice accounts of tort law include George Fletcher, 
Richard Epstein, John Borgo, Jules Coleman, and Ernest Weinrib, with 
Coleman and Weinrib being the most-often cited.20  Despite there being 
differences between their accounts, the convergences are more plentiful than 
the divergences, and their views all share the central tenet of the corrective 
justice theory: “[T]ort law is best explained by corrective justice” because “at 
its core tort law seeks to repair wrongful losses.”21  On this view, tort law is 
backward-looking and it involves the claims that one person has against 
                                                                                                               
Owen ed., 1995). 
18  Id. 
19  Keating, supra note 3, at 298. 
20  Id. at 298–99 n.11 
21  COLEMAN, supra note 6. 
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another person for the rights violations that were the result of the defendant’s 
wrongful conduct.  Thus, tort law aims to return the parties to the equilibrium 
that was disturbed by the wrongful conduct.  Whether this equilibrium to 
which corrective justice seeks to return the parties is itself just, is an 
important question, but this is a question for distributive justice.  In order to 
endorse the importance of corrective justice, one must think that there is an 
account of distributive justice that explains the value of a particular 
equilibrium point, but the question of corrective justice is nevertheless 
independent from the question of distributive justice.  Corrective justice 
theorists can share the belief that corrective justice is important, yet hold 
conflicting theories of distributive justice.  What corrective justice theories of 
tort law hold in common, though, is the belief that tort law is a backward-
looking institution that aims to repair wrongful losses.22                         
While economic theorists of torts have argued unrelentingly that 
corrective justice theorists are utterly mistaken and that tort law is only 
concerned with maximizing efficiency to society going forward, modern 
corrective justice theorists have been even more adamant in denying the 
plausibility of the economic theory of tort law.23  The idea of assessing 
liability between two litigants at bar solely by considering the costs and 
benefits for future members of society going forward strikes corrective 
justice theorists as unfair and barbaric.24  Characterizing the corrective justice 
theorists’ concerns, Gregory Keating writes: “[Deterring] cheapest cost-
avoiders from committing future harms is no more imposing justified 
liability in tort than hanging the innocent to deter future crimes is imposing 
justified criminal punishment.”25  For corrective justice theorists, forward-
looking concerns simply are (or should be) off the table in tort adjudication.26  
While different varieties of this argument from fairness are offered, what 
they hold in common is the position that sacrificing the current litigants for 
the benefits of future individuals is inappropriate.  
In addition to arguing that a forward-looking approach to tort law would 
be unfair, corrective justice theorists also argue that the economic account 
simply does not square with the facts of what occurs in the tort system.  
According to Coleman, if tort were a forward-looking institution, we would 
not necessarily create incentives for future members of society by holding 
those who commit the tortious wrongs liable.27  This would be an “oddly 
                                                
22  For an illuminating discussion about the relationship between distributive 
justice and corrective justice, see John Gardner, What is Tort Law For? Part 2. The 
Place of Distributive Justice, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW (John 
Oberdiek ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2014). 
23  See COLEMAN, supra note 6. 
24  Id.  
25  Keating, supra note 3, at 303.  
26  Id. 
27  See COLEMAN, supra note 6.  




indirect way of inducing other people to behave appropriately in the future,” 
and there would be more direct routes available to accomplish this regulatory 
goal.28  Said another way, a concern is that “[e]conomic analysis . . . cannot 
offer an equally elegant and persuasive explanation of tort’s adjudicative 
structure.”29  Another concern that corrective justice theorists raise for 
economic accounts is the fact that tort law adjudication uses concepts that are 
essentially backward-looking.  Coleman writes: “The relations among the 
central concepts of tort law—wrong, duty, responsibility, and repair—are 
best understood as expressing the fundamental normative significance of the 
victim-injurer relationship as it is expressed in the principle of corrective 
justice.”30 
Thus, as was the case for the economists’ claims, the corrective justice 
theorists’ view is comprised of two key components, and each component 
consists of both a normative and descriptive portion: First, the law should not 
be and is not forward-looking (but rather, should be and is backward-
looking).31  Second, in looking backward, what we should seek to do and 
what we do seek to do is repair wrongful losses.32 
 
C. Preliminary Reasons for Thinking that the Two Theories Are Compatible 
 
Prima facie, corrective justice theory and the traditional economic view 
seem to be theories of tort that are conceptually distinct and that might 
prescribe different assignments of liability in some, if not many, tort suits.  
Nevertheless, both theories might be somewhat attractive in their own right.  
Further, in cases where the two theories yield the same prescription, many 
proponents of one theory would likely at least find the goal of the other 
theory to be a collateral benefit of deciding the case in accordance with one’s 
favored theory.33  In other words, a corrective justice theorist, for example, 
might consider it to be a happy result of bringing about corrective justice in 
case X v. Y, that society’s future behavior will, as a result, lead to a more 
efficient allocation of resources.  Thus, given that there might be some 
attractive aspects to each theory, a question naturally arises: Despite their 
apparent differences, is corrective justice theory compatible with the 
traditional economic theory of tort law?  The common answer has been that 
they are not compatible, but this Article will argue that they are.  
As discussed, there are two main ways in which the economic theory of 
tort is different from the corrective justice theory of tort.  First, the economic 
theory is forward-looking whereas corrective justice is backward-looking.  
                                                
28  Keating, supra note 3, at 303.  
29  Id. at 305. 
30  COLEMAN, supra note 6, at 23. 
31  See Posner, supra note 17, at 99–100. 
32  See id.  
33  There might be some outliers, and Coleman might be one.  
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Second, the economic theory explicitly adopts efficiency as a societal goal, 
and actions in violation of this goal are what trigger liability (or, according to 
Posner, they are what constitute the substantive notion of “wrongful 
conduct”).34  Corrective justice theorists, on the other hand, deny that actions 
in violation of economic efficiency constitute wrongful conduct, although 
they do not provide a clear proposal of what precisely should constitute 
wrongful conduct.35 
What is striking about the arguments made by corrective justice theorists 
is that they often do not carefully distinguish between these two components 
of the economic theory of tort law.36  They frequently consider three different 
arguments to all be arguments against the economic theory of tort, and they 
treat the arguments interchangeably, often equivocating on the term 
“economic theory of tort law.”  The first set of these arguments is comprised 
of arguments against there being a forward-looking aspect of tort law.37  The 
second set of these arguments is comprised of arguments against efficiency 
as a societal goal (and against the notion of inefficient behavior constituting a 
potential substantive notion of “wrongful conduct”).38  Third, there are 
arguments against the full economic position—i.e., arguments against the 
view of tort that is forward-looking and appeals to efficiency as a societal 
goal.39  As a result of this lack of clarity, corrective justice theorists are not as 
successful as they think they are in arguing against economists. 
Despite making arguments of all three types listed above, corrective 
justice theorists seem to be most committed to showing tort to be a 
backward-looking institution.40  When they decry forward-looking accounts 
of tort law, however, they generally cite the alleged absurdities entailed by 
the entire economic position—i.e., the absurdities that they think would 
result if tort law were forward-looking and society’s goal were to maximize 
economic efficiency.41  While a successful identification of unattractive 
aspects of the full economic position would certainly give reason to doubt the 
full economic account, identifying these unattractive aspects would not 
necessarily give reason to doubt a forward-looking account of tort law that is 
not encumbered by a notion of efficiency.   
                                                
34  See generally Posner, supra note 17.  
35  See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 6. 
36  See, e.g., id.; Keating, supra note 3. 
37  See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 6; Keating, supra note 3. 
38  See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 6; Keating, supra note 3. 
39  See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 6; Keating, supra note 3. 
40  There is much evidence for this, but also indicative of this judgment is the fact 
that corrective justice theorists never articulate a positive account of “wrongful 
conduct.” Rather, when addressing “wrongful conduct,” they simply gesture at an 
account while directing most of their efforts toward showing the faults of the 
economists’ position.  See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 6, at 36. 
41  See, e.g., id.; Keating, supra note 3. 




As discussed above, one of the main concerns articulated by corrective 
justice theorists is that a forward-looking tort law would prescribe 
unattractive results—for example, the sacrifice of the rights or welfare of a 
litigant for the benefit of future members of society.42  This, of course, 
assumes that a forward-looking tort law would prescribe different results.  
Perhaps there might be cases where the full economic account would 
prescribe different results than would the backward-looking and non-
efficiency-based notion of corrective justice, but it is not clear that the 
forward-looking and backward-looking natures of the two accounts are 
contributing at all to the diverging prescriptions.  If we hold the substantive 
notion of “wrongful conduct” constant—be it an efficiency notion or a more 
murky corrective justice notion—it is far from clear that forward-looking and 
backward-looking accounts would ever yield different prescriptions in tort 
suits. 
In light of these suspicions, this Article will now explore the question of 
whether the forward-looking and backward-looking accounts of tort law are 
in fact compatible.  
 
 II. POSNER’S AND RAWLS’S COMPATIBILITY CLAIMS 
 
As mentioned in Part I, in the vast majority of the literature on tort, it is a 
forgone conclusion that forward-looking and backward-looking accounts of 
tort are incompatible.43  Two exceptions exist, however: Posner and Rawls.  
Posner and Rawls both think that forward-looking and backward-looking 
accounts can in fact be compatible—for related, but different reasons.44  This 
Part will describe and analyze the positions that Posner and Rawls offer, and 
it will conclude that neither one provides an account that satisfactorily shows 
that forward-looking and backward-looking accounts of tort are compatible.  
 
A. Posner’s Compatibility Claim 
 
According to Posner, the connection between corrective justice and the 
economic theory of tort law is a deep one. He writes: “Once the concept of 
corrective justice is given its correct Aristotelian meaning, it becomes 
possible to show that it is not only compatible with, but required by, the 
economic theory of law.”45  To support this point, Posner sets out to interpret 
Aristotle’s pioneering discussion of corrective justice in Book V, Chapter 4 
of the Nicomachean Ethics.46  In doing so, he finds much that lies in common 
                                                
42  See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 6, at 36; Keating, supra note 3. 
43  See supra Part I. 
44  See infra Parts II.A and II.B. 
45  Richard A. Posner, The Concept of Corrective Justice in Recent Theories of 
Tort Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 201 (1981). 
46  ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (David Ross trans., rev. ed. 1980). 
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between Aristotelian corrective justice and its descendants—current 
corrective justice theories.47  Posner’s research into Aristotelian notions of 
corrective justice, however, reveals one key feature of corrective justice that 
is emphasized in the Aristotelian account, but which Posner considers to be 
largely overlooked by current accounts: “[C]orrective justice is a procedural 
principle: the meaning of wrongful conduct must be sought elsewhere.”48  
For Aristotle, seeking to carry out corrective justice would not in and of itself 
determine what should be done.49  In order to know what corrective justice 
calls for, one would have to appeal to a notion of “wrongful conduct,” and 
determining what constitutes “wrongful conduct” is an inquiry to be carried 
out independently.  Thus, according to Posner, the Aristotelian notion of 
corrective justice can be filled in with any notion of “wrongful conduct,” and 
thus it is compatible with any account of what constitutes “wrongful 
conduct.”50  As Posner notes, Aristotle does delineate an account of 
“wrongful conduct” in Chapter 8 of Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics, but 
Aristotle makes clear that corrective justice would be compatible with other 
accounts.51  Further, Aristotle’s own account of “wrongful conduct” is not 
broad enough to include negligent behavior, and thus even current corrective 
justice theorists—who do want to think of negligence as potentially wrongful 
conduct—supply their own non-Aristotelian concept of “wrongful 
conduct.”52  
Given this analysis of Aristotle, Posner believes that corrective justice is 
both compatible with and required by the economic theory of tort law.53  It is 
compatible with the economic theory, according to Posner, because 
economics simply provides a substantive notion of wrongful conduct that can 
fill in the void provided by Aristotle’s procedural principle.54  According to 
Posner, the substantive notion of wrongful conduct imported by economics is 
“justice as efficiency.”55   On this account, any action that does not maximize 
efficiency is wrongful: “If A fails to take precautions that would cost56 less 
than their expected benefits in accident avoidance, thus causing an accident 
in which B is injured . . . the concept of justice as efficiency will be 
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48  Id. at 203.  
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violated.”57  Thus, the forward-looking economic account can be understood 
as an account that is compatible with corrective justice.             
Posner also argues that corrective justice is required by the economic 
theory of tort.  As Posner says, “justice as efficiency” cannot be brought 
about unless incentives are created to ensure that people act in accordance 
with this principle.58  This, Posner says, requires that we administer 
corrective justice in cases where parties violate the principle.59  Thus, unless 
the wrongs are rectified, the economic theory of law is unable to function.  
Anticipating criticism, Posner considers an important objection at the end 
of his article.  As he says, one might think that corrective justice and 
economic theory are in fact incompatible, because while they both result in 
the similar forms of redress, “they do so for different reasons.”60  One might 
think that the economic theorist carries out corrective justice merely in order 
to maximize efficiency going forward, while the Aristotelian carries out 
corrective justice in order to promote some notion of backward-looking 
justice.61  As Posner argues, though, this comparison is mistaken.62  In the 
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle does not explain the rationale of carrying out 
corrective justice or explain the end goal, but, rather, he merely explains 
what corrective justice is, and that there is a duty to carry out corrective 
justice.63  Thus, Posner concludes that it is perfectly coherent to understand 
corrective justice as an instrumental good—a good that is important because 
of the future benefits it will bring about.64  For Posner, corrective justice is a 
good because it is an instrument used to affect incentives influencing future 
behavior, thus bringing about the incentives that will be most efficient.65  The 
resulting maximization of happiness, Posner says, is the “ultimate objective 
of the just state.”66  
While perhaps Posner accomplishes the goal of his paper (demonstrating 
the compatibility of the economic theory of tort and the Aristotelian notion of 
corrective justice), the conclusion is not as satisfying as we might hope.  He 
does not demonstrate the compatibility of the economic theory of tort and 
current notions of corrective justice—notions that, unlike Aristotle’s, do 
articulate a rationale for corrective justice: the intrinsic value of backward-
looking justice.  Posner concedes as much, saying that he has “limited 
discussion to Aristotle’s concept of corrective justice and other concepts 
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might lead to other results, perhaps inconsistent with the economic 
approach.”67  Nevertheless, Posner takes himself to have accomplished two 
important tasks.  First, he has shown that corrective justice, in its original 
form, is compatible with economic theory, and second, he believes he has 
shifted the burden to current corrective justice theorists to “explain and 
justify their unorthodox usage” of the term “corrective justice.”68  Posner 
thinks that once modern corrective justice theorists attempt to explain and 
justify their usage, they will realize that they do subscribe to the Aristotelian 
view, and to the extent that this is the case, they will realize that corrective 
justice is compatible with the economic theory of tort law.69  
The problem for Posner, however, is that it’s far from obvious that he has 
succeeded in shifting the burden to modern corrective justice theorists.  Or, if 
he has, it’s not obvious that modern corrective justice theorists have been 
unable to meet the challenge.  Strong reasons have been provided for 
thinking that corrective justice is intrinsically valuable, or at least that the 
backward-looking equilibrium that it seeks to restore is intrinsically valuable.  
Further, it’s not clear what hangs on modern corrective justice theorists 
justifying “their unorthodox usage” of the term “corrective justice.”70  
Whatever it is that the current corrective justice theorists want to call their 
position, it seems clear that a tenet of this position is that corrective justice is 
intrinsically valuable.  To the extent that this is the case, Posner’s view seems 
to be that modern corrective justice theory and the economic theory of tort 
are incompatible.  He thinks that corrective justice is merely an instrument 
for affecting incentives that influence future behavior, and, more specifically, 
for bringing about the incentives that will be most efficient.71  
 
B. Rawls’s Compatibility Claim 
 
In his seminal article, Two Concepts of Rules, John Rawls takes up the 
question of the relationship between forward-looking and backward-looking 
aspects of the law—as well as the backward-looking and forward-looking 
aspects of other practices, such as promising.72  Rawls’s discussion of the law 
focuses on the context of the criminal law and not tort law, but his points 
apply analogously to the context of tort law if the appropriate substitutions 
are made (e.g., substitute corrective justice for retributivism).73 While there 
are some differences between the two contexts, Rawls takes his points to 
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apply broadly enough to encompass the backward-looking and forward-
looking debate in the context of tort law.  
Framing the debate, Rawls writes:  
 
For our purposes we may say that there are two 
justifications of punishment.  What we may call the 
retributive view is that punishment is justified on the 
grounds that wrongdoing merits punishment.  It is morally 
fitting that a person who does wrong should suffer in 
proportion to his wrongdoing.  That a criminal should be 
punished follows from his guilt, and the severity of the 
appropriate punishment depends on the depravity of his act.  
The state of affairs where wrongdoer suffers punishment is 
morally better than the state of affairs where he does not . . . 
.    
What we may call the utilitarian view holds that on the 
principle that bygones are bygones and that only future 
consequences are material to present decisions, punishment 
is justifiable only by reference to the probable consequences 
of maintaining it as one of the devices of the social order.  
Wrongs committed in the past are, as such, not relevant 
considerations for deciding what to do.  If punishment can be 
shown to promote effectively the interest of society it is 
justifiable, otherwise it is not. 
I have stated these two competing views very roughly to 
make one feel the conflict between them: one feels the force 
of both arguments and one wonders how they can be 
reconciled.74  
 
Having posed the challenge of reconciling the two conflicting, yet 
independently forceful, arguments, Rawls famously offers the following 
solution, which merits a lengthy quotation: 
 
One can say . . . that the judge and the legislator stand in 
different positions and looking different directions: one to 
the past, the other to the future.  The justification of what the 
judge does, qua judge, sounds like the retributive view; the 
justification of what the (ideal) legislator does, qua 
legislator, sounds like the utilitarian view . . . .  The answer, 
then, to the confusion engendered by the two views of 
punishment is quite simple: one distinguishes two offices, 
that of the judge and that of the legislator, and one 
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distinguishes their different stations with respect to the 
system of rules which make up the law; and then one notes 
that the different sorts of considerations which would usually 
be offered as reasons for what is done under the cover of 
these offices can be paired off with the competing 
justifications of punishment.  One reconciles the two views 
by the time-honored device of making them apply to 
different situations.  
But can it really be this simple?  Well, this answer 
allows for the apparent intent of each side.  Does a person 
who advocates the retributive view necessarily advocate, as 
an institution, legal machinery whose essential purpose is to 
set up and preserve correspondence between turpitude and 
suffering?  Surely not.  What retributionists have rightly 
insisted upon is that no man can be punished unless he is 
guilty, that is, unless he has broken the law.  Their 
fundamental criticism of the utilitarian account is that, as 
they interpret it, it sanctions an innocent person’s being 
punished (if one may call it that) for the benefit of society. 
On the other hand, utilitarians agree that punishment is 
to be inflicted only for the violation of law.  They regard this 
much as understood from the concept of punishment itself.  
The point of the utilitarian account concerns the institution 
as a system of rules: utilitarianism seeks to limit its use by 
declaring it justifiable only if it can be shown to foster 
effectively the good of society.  Historically it is a protest 
against the indiscriminate and ineffective use of the criminal 
law.  It seeks to dissuade us from assigning to penal 
institutions the improper, if not sacrilegious, task of 
matching suffering with moral turpitude.  Like others, 
utilitarians want penal institutions designed so that, as far as 
humanly possible, only those who break the law run afoul of 
it.  They hold that no official should have discretionary 
power to inflict penalties whenever he thinks it for the 
benefit of society; for on utilitarian grounds an institution 
granting such power could not be justified.75  
 
In many ways, what Rawls says is similar to what Posner says.  Both 
authors think that the legal institution itself is justified by forward-looking 
concerns—as Rawls says, the “institution as a system of rules” is justified by 
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Principles of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE 
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utilitarianism, which holds “the principle that bygones are bygones and that 
only future consequences are material to present decisions.”76  Further, both 
think that the backward-looking aspect of the law is necessary in order to 
carry out the institution’s forward-looking goals, and both think that this is 
the only reason why there is a backward-looking aspect of the law.77  Their 
views about the backward-looking aspect of the law do seem to differ 
somewhat, however.  For Posner, the backward-looking aspect of tort law 
has no intrinsic value—it is merely valuable instrumentally.78  Rawls, 
however, offers a more nuanced account.  He thinks that the reason we have 
a backward-looking aspect of the law is merely that it enables the 
institution—justified by forward-looking considerations—to function,79 but 
he seems to think that, once we have the law, it creates intrinsic backward-
looking value, to which a retributivist would rightfully appeal.80  In other 
words, Rawls seems to think that the existence of the law brings into 
existence intrinsic backward-looking values, and, in light of the existence of 
the legal system, the law now has backward-looking and forward-looking 
aspects that are both of intrinsic value.  This account certainly seems to be 
closer than Posner’s to an account that truly exhibits full compatibility 
between the intrinsically forward-looking and the intrinsically backward-
looking aspects of tort, but it still seems to fall short. 
Rawls thinks that this account will appease both self-proclaimed 
utilitarians and self-proclaimed retributivists, but this seems doubtful, and 
especially with respect to the retributivist.  In the passage quoted above, 
Rawls writes: “Does a person who advocates the retributive view necessarily 
advocate, as an institution, legal machinery whose essential purpose is to set 
up and preserve correspondence between turpitude and suffering? Surely 
not.”81  This seems to be mistaken.  As has been discussed (in the context of 
tort law, but the same points apply here), corrective justice theorists think 
that the very purpose of tort law, as an institution is to carry out corrective 
justice82—in other words, return society to the equilibrium at which it rested 
before having been disturbed by the wrongful conduct.  Furthermore, it 
seems implausible to suggest that moral norm of corrective justice is solely a 
function of the existence of a legal norm of corrective justice.83  Even 
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without a legal system carrying out corrective justice, it seems that we would 
have moral intuitions about the appropriateness of redress for wrongful 
inflictions of harm.  To a certain extent, however, Rawls does seem to be 
onto something when he suggests that backward-looking legal norms could 
bring about backward-looking moral norms: It does seem possible that 
people’s sense of morality is at least somewhat a function of the law.  In 
other words, people tend to think to some degree that breaking the law is a 
form of free riding and, as a default, it seems to be that one might think that 
breaking the law is immoral.  Thus, it does seem as though Rawls is right in 
identifying the phenomenon that the law affects people’s moral intuitions.84  
This is an illuminating point, and also hard to deny.  This notwithstanding, 
however, it also seems implausible to deny what Rawls himself denies: that 
our moral intuitions regarding corrective justice and retribution exist 
independently of the law, and part of the reason that we have the law is 
because of the fact that we have these backward-looking intrinsic values.85   
In his article, Rawls does not go as far as to state explicitly that it would 
be incompatible for the law’s purpose to be intrinsically backward-looking 
and also intrinsically forward-looking, but we can infer as much from what 
he does say.  He sets out to reconcile the forward-looking and backward-
looking justifications for the law, and he concludes that one can do so if one 
employs “the time-honored device of making them apply to different 
situations.”86  This does not say explicitly that we need to use this “time-
honored device,” but it would certainly be a much simpler and much more 
straightforward reconciliation to simply show that the two justifications 
simultaneously apply in all of the same situations.  Thus, if Rawls thought he 
could show that the justifications applied in the same situations, he would not 
resort to the “time-honored device.”  Furthermore, Rawls does explicitly say 
that, upon reflection, a retributivist would concede that he does not believe 
that the backward-looking values that he espouses apply to the legal system 
as a whole.87  
Having just discussed Rawls’s account of retributivism and the 
backward-looking aspect of the law, we see that Rawls is not espousing an 
account of the law on which the backward-looking aspect of the law is truly 
of intrinsic value—and thus he is not espousing an account of the law on 
which forward-looking and backward-looking aspects of the law are each 
truly of intrinsic value.  Thus, Rawls is not arguing that forward-looking and 
backward-looking accounts of the law are wholly compatible in the way that 
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this Article will argue (in Part III) that they are.88  Having thus already 
determined the answer to the question of whether Rawls offers a satisfactory 
explanation of how forward-looking and backward-looking accounts of the 
law can be compatible, we need not investigate whether Rawls’s account of 
the utilitarian position is plausible in order to arrive at an answer to the 
compatibility question.  This notwithstanding, it is worth briefly considering 
the plausibility of Rawls’s account of the utilitarian position, because the 
points raised and discussed here will lay the foundations for discussions in 
Part III.B and Part V. 
Would a utilitarian be satisfied with Rawls’s so-called reconciliation, or 
would he be dissatisfied just as the retributivist would be?  A utilitarian 
would agree with Rawls that the justification of the institution as a whole 
(and, more specifically, the decisions made by the legislator himself) is, and 
should be, justified by forward-looking considerations. The question that 
arises for the utilitarian is whether he would sign on to Rawls’s claim that 
when it comes to the role of the judge, qua judge, forward-looking 
considerations should not apply, and that this is the realm merely of 
backward-looking considerations.  In other words, would someone who 
thinks that the purpose of tort law is to bring about the best result for society 
going forward think that Rawls’s system stays true to, and accomplishes, this 
goal?  Or would he think that Rawls’s seeming concession means that his 
account is sacrificing at least some forward-looking benefits and thus 
straying somewhat from the position that tort should bring about the best 
results for society going forward? 
At first, it might seem that a utilitarian would want not only that there be 
an efficiency analysis carried out at the level of creating the legal institution 
and at the level of legislation, but also at the level of the judge.  The forward-
looking thinker seemingly would want all decisions to be made based on 
forward-looking considerations.  Rawls, however, points out that a system 
that allowed all decisions throughout the system to be made according to 
efficiency analyses would be self-defeating—it would lead to a less efficient 
result overall.89  As an example, he asks that we imagine an institution called 
“telishment . . . which is such that the officials set up by it have authority to 
arrange a trial for the condemnation of an innocent man whenever they are of 
the opinion that doing so would be in the best interest of society.”90  This 
would be an institution where officers at all levels, and not merely the 
legislators, are carrying out efficiency analyses.  According to Rawls, as a 
practical matter, there are numerous reasons for why this would be an 
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inefficient system on utilitarian terms.91  To name two: First, people would 
constantly be in fear of being telished even if they had not committed a 
crime, and second, people wouldn’t know what their attitudes should be 
towards people who have been telished, because they wouldn’t know 
whether these people were people who committed the crimes and thus would 
be punished under an institution of punishment or whether they were 
innocent and while appropriately telished, would not be appropriately 
punished.92  Interestingly, this reasonable conclusion that Rawls draws 
seemingly relies for support in part (though certainly not in full) on what 
Rawls denies—that we have pre-legal notions and intuitions regarding the 
backward-looking view of corrective justice and retribution.93  
Thus, Rawls thinks that even a utilitarian, in designing an institution, 
while designing it to be as efficient in utilitarian terms as possible, would 
thus not design a system in which a utility calculus would be carried out by 
all offices.94  As such, given these practical considerations, it seems that a 
utilitarian would choose to design his system in a rule utilitarian manner—
by creating rules that would not be mere rules of thumb, but which would 
exist to be followed without exception, because the system in which this 
occurs would be the one that would be best on the whole.95  These rules 
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would take the form of laws as well as other administrative policies and 
regulations regarding prosecutions, investigations, and other administrative 
tasks of officers of the state.  
One might ask, however, whether this type of a system is really the 
system that would maximize utility.  Perhaps, one might say, a system of 
telishment would be inefficient because of all the disvalue resulting from the 
fact that people know that it is the policy that is in effect, and thus an ideal 
system would be one in which utility calculations do occur by all officers of 
the state, but in which the general population does not know that this is the 
case.96  Suppose, for example, that the government from time to time takes 
part in scapegoating, where the government frames an innocent individual of 
a crime so as to avert a riot that would have caused an enormous amount of 
harm.  If carried out successfully, this would seemingly be efficient.  While 
Rawls concedes this, he thinks that practical factors (such as how to 
successfully keep the truth private) will prevent such a non-transparent 
regime from being feasible and remaining non-transparent, and thus 
successful.97  In light of these considerations, and in light of the disutility 
associated with a system of telishment, Rawls seems to be right that a 
forward-looking theorist would likely be satisfied with Rawls’s 
“reconciliation.”98 
 
III. THE COMPATIBILITY OF FORWARD-LOOKING AND BACKWARD-LOOKING 
ACCOUNTS OF TORT LAW 
 
A. The Meaning of the Terms “Forward-Looking” and “Backward-
Looking” 
 
According to Posner, it was plausible to maintain that forward-looking 
and backward-looking accounts of tort law are compatible, but the backward-
looking aspect of tort law is merely instrumentally valuable.99  It merely is 
part of the machinery that enables us to achieve, through incentive effects on 
future behavior, what is of intrinsic value—efficient results for the future.  
Rawls offers a different account, but one which similarly holds that the 
reason for having law and for deciding what in fact should be a law is only 
                                                                                                               
where the court carried out forward-looking efficiency analyses.  Thus, it seems that 
the current system, though it raise issues commonly raised in the context of rule 
utilitarianism, will be able to be defended with a cogent explanation of why it is not 
unstable in the way that rule utilitarianism is.  
96  For a pioneering and insightful discussion regarding the interesting question 
of whether morality should be “esoteric,” see HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF 
ETHICS 489–90 (7th ed. 1907) (1874).  
97  Rawls, supra note 72. 
98  Id.  
99  Posner, supra note 45. 
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that the system of law in general, and any specific law in particular, is of 
intrinsic value in the forward-looking sense.100  According to corrective 
justice theorists, however, the backward-looking aspect of tort law is of 
intrinsic value and is a (or the) reason for having the system of tort law and 
for having a particular action be tortious.  This Article so far has suggested 
that it could be the case that tort law can simultaneously be intrinsically 
forward-looking and intrinsically backward-looking.  In other words, these 
two claims might be compatible.  
In order to assess the truth of this possibility, we must first be sure that 
we understand precisely what we mean when we say that the forward-
looking aspect of tort law is of intrinsic value or that the backward-looking 
aspect is of intrinsic value.  As it happens, though, neither term is as 
straightforward as it seems.  Further, the former seemingly is much more 
straightforward than the latter.  To say that the forward-looking aspect of tort 
law is of intrinsic value is simply to say that it is good in and of itself to bring 
about good results going forward—with the term “good results” being left to 
be filled in with one’s preferred substantive notion of societal good.  
It is less clear what one might mean if one says that the backward-
looking aspect of tort law is of intrinsic value.  Why is this unclear?  First 
off, the term itself is somewhat confusing: Despite the fact that it’s called 
“backward-looking,” clearly whatever value is brought about by the 
disposition in the tort case will not affect the past.  The past has passed us by.  
Thus it’s important to be clear that the theory is merely backward-looking—
as opposed to backward-affecting or something of this sort.  While this much 
might seem obvious, the immediate implication of this might not be.  Since 
whatever backward-looking value is brought about by the case’s disposition 
will occur at or after the time of the conclusion of the case, this value—
whatever it turns out to be and to whomever it turns out to accrue—will have 
to be included in the forward-looking account’s calculus as well.  As such, at 
this early stage of the analysis, there already seems to be some evidence that 
the backward-looking and forward-looking views might not be related quite 
in the way that it has been thought they are. 
One could deny that a court’s judgment in favor of a tort plaintiff would 
affect the events of the past while still maintaining that the value of the 
judgment in some sense is in the past or attaches to past events or states of 
affairs.  This is not incoherent—and in fact some writers do seem to 
articulate a view along these lines101—but it seems much more plausible to 
suggest that the value of the court’s judgment accrues at or after the time of 
the judgment.  Further, if a decision is bringing about value at or after the 
time of the judgment, it seems that this value must be experienced by 
particular people, as a function of the improved experience, on net, of these 
individuals.  This too could be denied, and thus there might be people who 
                                                
100  Rawls, supra note 72. 
101  See COLEMAN, supra note 6. 




would hold that the backward-looking value does occur at or after the 
judgment, but that it is a value that applies to society on the whole, and not to 
individual people.  Thus, there are at least three views one might hold about 
what the backward-looking value actually is, but it seems that the most 
plausible version is the version that describes overall value as a function of 
the value added to particular lives—after all, it seems that everything that is 
valuable to us is valuable to us because of its effect on lives.  At the very 
least, however, even if one did espouse one of the two views that appear to 
be less plausible, it seems that these other views could be characterized as 
merely an additional way of describing the very same set of facts as those on 
which the value accrues to particular individuals in the present and future.  In 
light of these points, it seems reasonable to proceed within a framework in 
which backward-looking value must be experienced by particular people as a 
function of the improved experience, on net, of these individuals.  
The question then becomes: To whom does this backward-looking value 
accrue?  The clearest answer here is that the plaintiff—who was wronged and 
who has now recovered his losses—is the one who gets this value.  Cases 
will vary, but it is also likely that individuals who are unrelated to the case 
but who have heard about the wrong that was inflicted on (or befell) the 
plaintiff will get value from hearing of the judgment in the plaintiff’s favor 
and against the defendant.  In some cases this value gotten by third parties 
might take the form not of greater well-being, but rather, the form of averting 
the negative feelings they might have had if they had become aware of a 
decision in favor of the defendant.  
At this point it is important to make a few general points.  First, this 
backward-looking value of a tort judgment, importantly, is an intrinsic value.  
According to Posner, the backward-looking aspect of a tort case was valuable 
only for instrumental reasons—in particular, tort judgments against tortious 
defendants would bring about the appropriate incentives to maximize 
efficiency going forward.102  The backward-looking value discussed here, 
though, is intrinsic.  It is valuable in and of itself.  Second, in light of the fact 
that both backward-looking and forward-looking intrinsic values occur after 
the tort judgment, it is important to make clear what the distinction is 
between the two.  A backward-looking intrinsic value, according to the 
analysis here, is a value that accrues to individuals after the court’s decision, 
but which is a function either of a plaintiff’s financial gain or of an 
individual’s—be it the plaintiff’s or a third party’s—sentiments regarding the 
fairness, appropriateness, or general fittingness of the court’s judgment, in 
light of the wrongness of the events that gave rise to the lawsuit.  This is 
what it means for the value to be backward-looking.  
A forward-looking intrinsic value, on the other hand, can now be 
understood in two different ways—seemingly both of which had been 
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assumed beforehand to be equal.  First, we can understand the forward-
looking intrinsic value to be the value brought about to society going forward 
that is due to the incentives and actions brought about as a result of the 
expectations that liability will in the future be applied as it was in this case.  
In other words, this is the value brought about by how people will act in the 
shadow of the recent addition to (or entrenchment, or clarification, or 
specification of, or zero change at all to) the law.  On the other hand, we can 
understand the forward-looking intrinsic value to be the value brought about 
for society going forward in total, regardless of the value’s mechanism or the 
form it takes.  The difference between these two forward-looking measures 
of intrinsic value is that the first one does not include the backward-looking 
intrinsic value, whereas the second one does.  
Which of these two forward-looking intrinsic value measures, then, will 
be the one that is relevant for the inquiry into whether the forward-looking 
and backward-looking aspects of tort law can each simultaneously be of 
intrinsic value?  Both measures could be relevant in different ways, as will 
become clear in Part V, but, for the time being, we need not choose, and this 
is for the following reason: Even if the relevant comparison were only 
between the backward-looking account and the more inclusive of the two 
forward-looking accounts, unless the backward-looking intrinsic value of a 
judgment outweighed the value of the narrower of the two forward-looking 
accounts in every single case where the backward-looking and the inclusive 
forward-looking views allegedly cut in opposite directions (assuming, 
arguendo, what this article denies, that any cases of  divergence exist), there 
wouldn’t be full compatibility between the backward-looking intrinsic value 
and the inclusive forward-looking intrinsic value.  Further, if there are or 
were cases of divergence between the backward-looking value and the 
narrow forward-looking value, there is no reason to think that, in every single 
case, the narrow forward-looking value would be moot because it would be 
outweighed by the backward-looking value.  None of the writers who argue 
that forward-looking and backward-looking aspects of tort can diverge think 
that the narrow forward-looking value would be outweighed by the 
backward-looking value in every possible case.103   
Thus, if the claim that the backward-looking intrinsic value is compatible 
with the forward-looking intrinsic value is true, then the backward-looking 
intrinsic value will have to be compatible with both versions of the forward-
looking intrinsic value claim.  This, recall, is because the compatibility claim 
is not a claim that forward-looking intrinsic value and backward-looking 
intrinsic value accounts of tort law can be compatible in a tort case (i.e., that 
there is a possible case in which both would have intrinsic value), but, rather, 
that they go hand in hand—that in any case where one has intrinsic value, the 
other one does as well.  
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B. The Distinction Between “The Law Itself” and “The Legal System on the 
Whole” 
 
Despite the fact that both Posner’s and Rawls’s discussions are about the 
possibility of there being compatibility between forward-looking and 
backward-looking accounts, it’s interesting to note that there is a very 
important way in which the subject matter they address is distinct.  Posner 
addresses the question of whether there is compatibility between forward-
looking and backward-looking accounts of the law itself, whereas Rawls 
addresses the question of whether there is compatibility between forward-
looking and backward-looking accounts of the whole legal system.  Both of 
these questions are interesting, important, and worthy of investigation and 
discussion in their own right, but it is crucial to distinguish between them.  
Though neither Posner nor Rawls necessarily is guilty of claiming to discuss 
one while in fact discussing or drawing conclusions about the other, neither 
author distinguishes their question from the related one that they are not 
addressing.  Rawls does make the distinction between justifying an 
institution and justifying a particular execution of a rule, but, surprisingly, he 
does not distinguish his inquiry from an inquiry into the backward-looking 
and forward-looking aspects of the law itself.104  As such, since the 
justification of the execution of a particular rule is a question under the 
umbrella of justifying the institution as a whole, questions regarding the 
backward-looking and forward-looking aspects of the law itself go 
untouched.  As a result of Posner’s and Rawls’s failure to distinguish their 
question from the question they are not addressing, the distinction has gone 
somewhat unnoticed, and many future authors have muddied the waters by 
mistakenly treating the two questions interchangeably, and thus, 
unsurprisingly, have come to unwarranted conclusions.105  In light of this, 
some further clarification will be helpful.  
In what follows, this section will address various points that, though not 
discussed by Posner and Rawls, relate to the material that they do discuss, 
and are natural issues given rise to by Rawls’s distinction between justifying 
an institution and justifying a particular execution of a rule.  The section will 
argue that we need to be clear and explicit about the distinction between 
claims about the forward-looking and backward-looking aspects of a 
government or legal regime on the whole (and compatibility between the 
two) and claims about the forward-looking and backward-looking aspects 
(and compatibility between the two) of the law (or even more specifically, a 
particular law).  The law is one of many aspects of a government or legal 
regime.  Among the extremely numerous other tasks a government has are 
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the following three: prosecutions, investigations, and behavior by law 
enforcement and administrative officers.  
In creating a governmental institution, it seems that people will want to 
create the best possible institution, defined according to some metric of 
goodness.  In what follows, this section will take maximizing happiness as 
the maximandum, but analogous accounts can be described.  Thus, for our 
purposes, suppose that someone justifying a governmental institution will 
want to maximize happiness.  As described in Part III.A, this can be 
understood as the more inclusive version (or the all-things-considered 
version) of the forward-looking view.  This inclusive forward-looking view 
of the institution will be similar to the inclusive forward-looking view of the 
law, in the sense that it will be made up of a backward-looking component 
and also a narrow forward-looking component.  As was the case with the 
backward-looking account of the law itself, the backward-looking account of 
the legal institution on the whole will be the intrinsic value or disvalue 
brought about due to the sentiments regarding fairness to the litigants in the 
case at bar.  The narrow forward-looking component in the context of value 
of the legal institution as a whole, however, will be different from the narrow 
forward-looking component in the context of the law itself.  The latter was 
defined as benefits being brought about due to how people would act due to 
incentive effects of the law.  The narrow forward-looking component in the 
context of the value of the legal institution as a whole, however, is not 
focused on changes in incentives brought about by a new law, since there 
might not be a new law, but rather, more broadly, on all effects of a decision.  
In the case of scapegoating, for example, there is no difference in the law that 
is brought about that affects one behavior.  Rather, people’s behavior is 
affected by their factual beliefs being different than they otherwise would be, 
and thus their emotions and motivations being different than they would be, 
but the changes in these beliefs and emotions are not precipitated by a change 
in the law itself.  
Thus, consider once again Rawls’s scapegoating case.106  If scapegoating 
(or something that is similar in relevant respects) were carried out 
successfully in the hypothetical cases that corrective justice theorists are 
concerned about, this would seemingly maximize forward-looking results in 
the inclusive sense.  It would have a bad backward-looking result for he who 
knew the truth (i.e., the victim of the scapegoating), but, as stipulated, it 
would bring about narrow forward-looking benefits that outweigh this 
backward-looking disvalue, and thus the inclusive forward-looking result 
would be positive.  Thus, since in this type of a case the government on the 
whole’s actions have a positive narrow forward-looking effect but a negative 
backward-looking effect, this is a clear example of a case that illustrates the 
possibility of a divergence between the forward-looking and backward-
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looking aspects of a government’s actions.  At the very least, there will not 
always be compatibility between forward-looking and backward-looking 
aspects of the actions of a government or legal regime on the whole.  
While perhaps a scapegoating case here and there would be likely to be 
feasible, however, it seems that a system that includes a greater amount of 
something like scapegoating (or even more extremely, a system that institutes 
Rawls’s telishment) will bring about great anxiety and on the whole will not 
maximize happiness.  This is an empirical question, but Rawls’s point to this 
effect seems plausible.  It seems quite possible that a society that maximizes 
happiness will be one that is transparent and that has law and that holds 
people liable if and only if they have violated laws.107   
Thus, though there might be potential divergences between backward-
looking and (narrow) forward-looking accounts of a government, it seems 
possible that it might be the case that a government that in fact will be 
desirable according to either the backward-looking or (narrow) forward-
looking account might always be desirable according to both.  In other 
words, perhaps it might be the case that there is full compatibility between 
(narrow) forward-looking and backward-looking accounts of a government 
in governments that are desirable—i.e., where the inclusive forward-looking 
result is positive.  Thus, the question now is whether this would in fact be the 
case.  
This, then, is what brings us to the question of whether there is 
compatibility between the forward-looking and backward-looking aspects of 
the law itself.  What ultimately matters to proponents of the forward-looking 
account and proponents of the backward-looking account is whether the 
society we live in has a government whose effect, on the whole, is consistent 
with the forward-looking or backward-looking account, respectively.  Thus, 
if it is in fact the case that the types of societies discussed above—that are 
not transparent, governed by law, and holding people liable if and only if 
they have violated laws—are not desirable, we need not concern ourselves 
with these.  The question then becomes whether societies that do meet these 
constraints have complete compatibility between the forward-looking and 
backward-looking aspects, and this will thus depend on the question of 
whether forward-looking and backward-looking accounts of the law itself are 
compatible.  Thus, the question now is: Are the backward-looking and 
forward-looking accounts of the law (or, more specifically, tort law) 
compatible?  
This foregoing discussion shows us two things.  First, it explains the 
relationship between the compatibility question, as it pertains to the legal 
regime on the whole, and the compatibility question, as it pertains to the 
content of the law itself.  This explains why the latter question is important, 
since, in practice, answering it is a means to answering the former question—
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and the former question is the broader and deeper one.  Thus, we see the 
importance of the debate about the compatibility of forward-looking and 
backward-looking accounts of the law itself.  Secondly, and perhaps even 
more importantly for this Article’s purposes, this discussion flags a way in 
which many (if not most) authors have gone astray in debating the 
compatibility of forward-looking and backward-looking accounts of the law 
itself—and this, specifically, is the debate in the literature that this Article 
has taken as its focus.  In their attempts to show the incompatibility of the 
forward-looking and backward-looking aspects of the law itself, authors have 
mistakenly pointed to cases of potential divergence between forward-looking 
and backward-looking aspects of a government or legal system on the 
whole.108  This is a mistake, and this does not in any way speak to the 
question of compatibility between forward-looking and backward-looking 
accounts of the law itself.  The paradigmatic example that illustrates this 
mistake is the way in which authors use the scapegoating case to draw 
inferences about the compatibility of the forward-looking and backward-
looking accounts of the law itself.109   
Thus, going forward, if we are able to identify these mistakes and avoid 
making them, this will allow us to approach the compatibility question 
regarding the law itself with a much clearer lens.  Now armed with this 
clearer lens, we turn to an unobstructed exploration of this question.  
 
C. The Compatibility Claim 
 
Having clarified what we mean by the intrinsic value of the backward-
looking aspect of tort and the intrinsic value of the forward-looking aspect of 
tort, and having distinguished the compatibility question regarding the law 
itself from the compatibility question regarding the government or legal 
system on the whole, we are now able to delve into the meat of the issue.  
The question now becomes whether the forward-looking and backward-
looking accounts would be compatible if we hold fixed a substantive notion 
of wrongful conduct for the two accounts.  In other words, suppose that 
behavior that we think is wrongful and meriting backward-looking redress in 
tort is also the type of behavior the avoidance of which we think should 
constitute societal goals going forward.  Whether this supposition is a 
practical one will be addressed in greater detail in Part IV, but, for the time 
being, we will assume that it is and ask whether there would ever be a 
divergence between the forward-looking and backward-looking accounts if 
this were the case.   
Let’s begin by considering two (of many) possible frameworks for how a 
society might define the substantive notion of wrongful conduct and the 
corresponding substantive notion of what should constitute societal goals 
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going forward.  One such framework is one in which society’s goal is 
maximizing efficiency.110  Another such framework is one in which society 
aims to minimize instances of wrongful conduct of a more murky sort that is 
commonly alluded to by corrective justice theorists.        
 
1. The efficiency-based substantive account 
 
First, let’s consider the efficiency framework, where Posner’s article has 
already done most of the work.  As Posner discusses, if tort law is to be 
forward-looking and also aim to maximize efficiency, tort law will aim to 
make people internalize the externalities they impose on others.111  This will 
be accomplished by holding people liable in tort for the costs they impose on 
others when their conduct violates the principle of justice-as-efficiency—
when the total costs of their conduct outweigh the total benefits of their 
conduct.  This way, assuming that behavior of this sort is detectable enough, 
tort law will provide people with the incentives necessary to maximize 
efficiency—at least in broad strokes.  Furthermore, if the substantive notion 
of wrongful conduct adhered to by the society is that wrongful behavior is 
behavior that violates justice-as-efficiency, then it is precisely in the cases 
where liability will be needed to bring about good incentives that people will 
feel that there is a wrong that, for moral reasons, deserves redress.  In other 
words, the very cases where liability will be prescribed by the forward-
looking account of intrinsic value will be the same cases where liability will 
be prescribed by a backward-looking account of intrinsic value.                                    
Furthermore, at least at first glance, this convergence between the 
forward-looking and backward-looking accounts seems to make some sense.  
It doesn’t immediately seem implausible that if society’s goal were to 
maximize efficiency, then it would be precisely these actions (in violation of 
justice-as-efficiency) that we might, as a matter of psychological fact, think 
are wrongful.  Acts of this sort, we might say, are acts that are selfish, and 
acts where the agent does not show sufficient regard for the interests of 
others.  Further, it seems possible that there might simply be one thought or 
intuition that lies behind, causes, and manifests itself in both the forward-
looking view and the backward-looking efficiency views.  They might be 
different manifestations of the same view.  It’s important to note, again, that 
unlike with Posner’s account,112 the backward-looking value in this account 
is of intrinsic value.  Thus, by placing liability on parties that act “selfishly,” 
tort law would simultaneously be intrinsically backward-looking and 
forward-looking.  
                                                
110  In what follows, this section will describe the efficiency account where 
efficiency means maximizing happiness, but one could similarly plug in bare 
economic efficiency if one were so inclined.                 
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It is also important to note the following brief clarification regarding the 
efficiency account: At first glance it might seem as though a judge trying to 
determine whether a litigant has violated justice-as-efficiency (and thus has 
acted tortiously) is carrying out the same process that a judge would have 
carried out if his job were to bring about the best result according to the 
forward-looking aspect of the government or legal system as a whole—
discussed at length in Part III.B.  Despite the similarity between these two 
potential tasks for a judge, however, they are importantly distinct.  While 
both tasks involve efficiency analyses, these analyses are of a different 
nature.  In the case in question in this section, where a judge is determining 
whether a litigant has violated justice-as-efficiency, the analysis is simply an 
investigation into whether or not the defendant acted efficiently by 
performing (or failing to perform) the act in question.  The other analysis—
where the judge’s task is to further the forward-looking aspect not of the law 
itself, but of the government or legal system as a whole—would involve the 
judge asking simply whether holding the defendant in the case at bar liable 
would be an efficient action.  Part of this analysis might be a function of the 
analysis of whether the defendant acted efficiently, but this need not 
necessarily be the case, and even if this were relevant, there might be many 
other questions, inquiries, and factors that would be relevant to the decision 
of whether the action of the court holding the defendant liable would be an 
efficient one.   
Clarification aside, and now returning to the justice-as-efficiency account 
itself, the following is an objection that might be raised to the alleged 
convergence between the forward-looking and backward-looking aspects of 
tort law in the context of efficiency: One might say that while perhaps party 
X is the cheapest cost-avoider in a particular instance, and X should be liable 
on a forward-looking account, if X is complying with the law, then X would 
not be liable on a backward-looking account.  This objection fails, though, 
because on the efficiency account, the fact that X is the cheapest cost-avoider 
means that X is in violation of justice-as-efficiency, and thus, X has engaged 
in wrongful conduct.  While this objection does not point to a difficulty with 
the backward-looking / forward-looking convergence, what it does show is 
that there might be reasons why we (and even some self-proclaimed 
advocates of justice-as-efficiency) perhaps should not endorse efficiency 
violations as the substantive notion of wrongful conduct.  This issue will be 
discussed at length in Part IV.B. 
 
2. The murky corrective-justice-based substantive account 
 
An analogous account seemingly can be given of the convergence of 
forward-looking and backward-looking tort law in a framework where 
society’s goal is to minimize the amount of some other notion of “wrongful 
conduct” that a corrective justice theorist might endorse.  Whatever our 




substantive notion of wrongful conduct might be, it seems as though holding 
people liable for conduct of this sort (and thus, bringing about backward-
looking intrinsic value) would also be the way to best deter future wrongful 
conduct (and thus, bring about forward-looking intrinsic value).   
One might think, however, that there would be a divergence between the 
forward-looking and backward-looking approaches to the extent that holding 
people liable also for conduct that is only marginally non-wrongful would 
result in fewer wrongful acts going forward (because people would take extra 
care not to act wrongfully).  The thought here would be that there would be 
some types of conduct that are barely on the non-wrongful side of the divide 
that should not result in liability on a backward-looking account, but that 
should on a forward-looking account.  This, however, is mistaken, and for 
the following reason: The more accurate way to describe the backward-
looking goal here is not merely to bring about redress for wrongful harms, 
but rather, to bring about redress for wrongful harms and to not bring about 
redress for conduct that does not constitute a wrongful harm.  Thus, 
similarly, the forward-looking goal here would be not merely to deter 
wrongful harms, but both to deter wrongful harms and to not deter conduct 
that does not constitute a wrongful harm.  Thus, in light of this 
clarification113, it seems as though tailoring the liability-non-liability point to 
the wrongful-non-wrongful point would not only best achieve the two 
components of the backward-looking goal, but it would also seem to best 
achieve the two components of the forward-looking goal.  
As was the case with the efficiency framework, it seems as though this 
more murky “wrongful conduct” framework is not immediately implausible.  
As was the case with the efficiency framework, it seems that whatever the 
overarching value adhered to by the individuals in this framework is, it likely 
is the cause of both the corresponding forward-looking intuition and the 
corresponding backward-looking intuition.  Furthermore, though this section 
has just canvased two possible frameworks, it seems that the reasoning here 
could be expanded to other substantive notions of wrongful conduct and 
substantive notions of society’s forward-looking goals.  Thus, there is reason 
to think that if we hold fixed the substantive notion of wrongness and societal 
goals, the forward-looking and backward-looking accounts would yield the 
same prescriptions of liability and non-liability in all possible cases.  
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1. The “fundamental principle” debate 
 
If it is in fact the case that, holding an account of wrongful conduct 
constant, a forward-looking account’s prescriptions will be coextensive with 
the prescriptions of a backward-looking account, this is an important 
revelation.  Further, it’s important to realize that this claim is very different 
from Posner’s claim, discussed in Part II.  Posner only attempts to show that 
the economic theory of tort law is compatible with the Aristotelian notion of 
corrective justice.114  Posner makes it very clear that the reason why the 
economic theory of tort is compatible with Aristotle’s account of corrective 
justice is that Aristotle does not give a rationale for the duty of corrective 
justice—the Aristotelian account is non-committal about whether corrective 
justice is an intrinsic good or a mere instrumental good.115  This opens up 
room for Posner’s claim, because Posner thinks that corrective justice is 
merely good to the extent that it maximizes economic efficiency going 
forward.116  Not only is Posner only claiming that the economic theory of tort 
is compatible with the Aristotelian notion of corrective justice, but he is 
explicitly pessimistic about the economic theory of tort being compatible 
with what he takes to be the current corrective justice theorists’ positions.117  
Posner could and should have gone further.  There is no reason why tort 
cannot be intrinsically backward-looking and intrinsically forward-looking.  
It could well be, however, that corrective justice theorists and economic 
theorists would still diverge in their views about what constitutes wrongful 
conduct.  Nevertheless, Posner still stops a step too short, because on the 
most hotly contested issue in the debate, the two views are in fact 
compatible.  
If it were not the case that forward-looking and backward-looking 
accounts of tort were coextensive, debates about the “fundamental,” “core,” 
or “sovereign”118 principles of tort law would have great interest.  
Furthermore, the fact that forward-looking and backward-looking accounts 
would have some overlapping prescriptions would explain why terms such as 
“fundamental” are used.  For example, a corrective justice theorist might 
acknowledge that in some cases his theory would have the collateral benefit 
of bringing about good forward-looking results, yet still be able to say that 
corrective justice or a backward-looking principle is the fundamental 
principle of tort law.  In other words, he would be saying that when there is a 
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conflict between theories, we know that it is corrective justice’s prescription 
that is the one we should follow.  
Even if the convergence thesis is true, though, this does not mean that 
there is no logical space for a debate about the “fundamental” principle of 
tort law to continue.  The camps might continue to argue that it is their 
principle that is fundamental, and that it is a contingent fact that the two 
accounts provide coextensive prescriptions. (Interestingly, it seems as though 
much of the current debate about the “fundamental” principle might fit into 
the category of this paragraph.  Current use of the term “fundamental 
principle” is frequently aimed at cases of obvious convergence.119  It might 
even be the minority of cases where the term is employed to point to the 
appropriate principle to guide prescriptions in cases of divergence.)  It seems 
as though this type of a debate is and would be misguided, however.  It’s not 
clear what it would even mean, in this context, to say that corrective justice, 
for example, is the fundamental principle of tort law.  Perhaps one way to 
understand the claim would be as a claim about the intention of the framers 
of tort law.  If so, this inquiry would be akin to, and would be confronted 
with many of the difficulties associated with, statutory interpretation.  Tort 
law has gradually been formed by numerous judicial decisions and it would 
be impossible to attribute a single intention to the numerous contributors.120  
Furthermore, even in particular cases, panels of judges often reach a majority 
despite there being no consensus as to the rationale for the decision.  Thus, it 
seems fruitless to attack the issue in this way.  Alternatively, one might think 
that the fundamental principle of tort law would mean “the most important 
aspect of tort law,” or something to this effect.  But we already know there is 
no shortage of debate about this.  Thus, while we could still debate what 
constitutes the fundamental principle of tort law even if the various principles 
converge in what they prescribe, for a debate of this sort to be fruitful, the 
first step should involve explaining precisely what is meant by 
“fundamental.”  Without requiring a clear understanding of this, various 




While this Article has argued that a forward-looking account of tort is 
compatible with a backward-looking account of tort, what this means for the 
debate between corrective justice theorists and economic theorists depends 
on a few things.  For one, it depends on how they describe their positions.  If 
the economic account is understood as holding that “the only intrinsic goal of 
tort law is forward-looking” and the corrective justice account is understood 
as holding that “the only intrinsic goal of tort law is backward-looking,” then 
it seems that both accounts are false.  If, however the economic account is 
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understood as holding that “tort law always has an intrinsic forward-looking 
goal” and the corrective justice account is understood as holding “tort law 
always has an intrinsic backward-looking goal,” then it seems that both 
accounts are correct, and that they are compatible.   
Even if this is the case, there might still be disagreement between 
economists and corrective justice theorists (if we still want to use these 
labels) about what is or should be the substantive notion of wrongfulness or 
the substantive notion of society’s forward-looking goals.  As is, economists 
argue for an efficiency-based notion, whereas corrective justice theorists 
espouse something less precisely defined, but something that is, at least 
prima facie, distinct from efficiency.  Determining what this substantive 
notion is or should be is no simple question, and it is this all-important 
question that has been partially obscured by the debate about whether tort 
law’s fundamental principle is forward-looking or backward-looking.  
While perhaps there would still be vigorous debate between what we 
might still refer to as economists and corrective justice theorists, the 
disagreement within the two camps might be just as great as the 
disagreement between the camps.  While Posner originally articulated a 
purely economic account, he has since espoused a more broadly welfare-
based approach.121  Further, welfare-based approaches can be cashed out in 
numerous ways.  Corrective justice theorists, on the other hand, are also 
capable of articulating a number of extremely different accounts of what 
wrongful behavior consists in.  Not only might the disagreement within 
camps be as great as the disagreement between them, but it is likely that in 
some cases, some so-called economic views will resemble some so-called 
corrective justice views more than they resemble other views under the 
economic umbrella.   
Thus, going forward, it is important that we not let ourselves get drawn 
in to the debate between corrective justice theorists and economic theorists 
about whether tort law is forward-looking or backward-looking.  Instead of 
being led astray in this way, we must keep our focus on the real question—
how we should understand the substantive notion of wrongful conduct and 
the substantive notion of society’s forward-looking goals.122  Hopefully, now 
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armed with greater clarity, we will be better equipped to make progress on 
this important issue. 
  
 IV. IDENTIFYING A PLAUSIBLE SUBSTANTIVE ACCOUNT 
 
If the above reasoning is correct and the backward-looking and forward-
looking accounts would be coextensive in their prescriptions if the 
substantive notion of wrongness and societal goals were held fixed, what this 
shows is that backward-looking and forward-looking accounts of tort are 
theoretically compatible.  This has widely been denied in the literature, and 
thus constitutes an important realization in and of itself.  Nevertheless, even 
if this theoretical compatibility claim is true, it could be the case, as a 
practical matter, that people—be they self-proclaimed corrective justice 
theorists, economists, or others—do not, as a matter of fact, subscribe to the 
same substantive views for both the forward-looking and backward-looking 
aspects of tort law.  If this were the case, and an individual had two different 
substantive views for the two different aspects of tort, this would suggest that 
tort law would not simultaneously be able to fully coincide with such an 
individual’s forward-looking and backward-looking views.123  For such a 
person, then, it would seem as though a question would arise as to whether 
tort law should be an institution that seeks to further forward-looking value 
or backward-looking value, or some mix of the two.  Thus, the question that 
confronts us at this point is whether, as a practical fact, our substantive 
notion of wrongfulness lines up with our substantive notion of societal goals.  
This Part will consider in further depth the two most salient and plausible 
candidates for the substantive notions—the murky rights-based corrective 
justice notion and the efficiency notion—and it will explore whether it is 
plausible to maintain either of them as the substantive notion for both 
components of one’s forward-looking / backward-looking view pair.  It will 
consider various interesting sub-issues, but the conclusion will be that it 
currently does not seem to be plausible to hold either of the two substantive 
notions for both one’s forward-looking and backward-looking view.  The 
murky corrective justice substantive notion does not provide a plausible 
forward-looking view, yet the efficiency substantive notion does not provide 
a plausible backward-looking view.  
Given this finding, Part V will proceed by showing that this practical 
divergence turns out to be much smaller than one might think, and it is thus 
still the case that we do have almost complete practical convergence.  This 
notwithstanding, it discusses what the implications of the divergences that do 
exist are for the well-being of our society.  It then considers approaches that 
                                                
123  Unless, by some very odd coincidence, the liability regime prescribed by the 
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can be taken to eliminate the divergence and bring about not only theoretical 
compatibility but also practical compatibility between forward-looking and 
backward-looking accounts of tort.  The Article will argue that this is in fact 
a possibility and it will offer some practical proposals for how to carry out a 
transformation project of this sort.  
A last note before proceeding: The theoretical compatibility claim itself 
thus turns out to be of both instrumental and intrinsic value.  The 
instrumental importance: If it weren’t for its truth, the possibility of bringing 
about the practical convergence that the Article proposes wouldn’t even 
exist.  This convergence would be valuable—and thus it is of instrumental 
value.  The intrinsic importance: Even if the above-mentioned practical 
convergence were not possible, it is an important revelation that the forward-
looking and backward-looking aspects of tort are theoretically compatible, 
because it shows that authors have been mistaken about what precisely is at 
issue in the debate and that authors have been mistaken about where the 
action lies in tort law and about what underlies different views.  As such, this 
discovery will bring about substantially greater clarity.  
And now we turn to the exploration of whether it is plausible to maintain 
an efficiency or a murky corrective justice substantive notion for both 
components of one’s forward-looking / backward-looking view pair.  
 
A. The Murky Corrective-Justice-Based Substantive Account 
 
Ultimately, this section will argue that it is not plausible to hold (and that 
we do not hold) the murky corrective justice substantive notion for both the 
forward-looking and backward-looking accounts of tort law.  First, however, 
this Part will consider and reject a common reason—offered by non-
consequentialists—for believing that we do not hold this substantive 
forward-looking / backward-looking pair.  After explaining the non-
consequentialist’s claim, it will argue that it is mistaken for two reasons: 
First, it is based on a contradictory and implausible account of value.  
Second, even if the non-consequentialist account were plausible, it still 
wouldn’t show that it’s incoherent, problematic, or implausible to hold the 
murky corrective justice substantive notion for both the forward-looking and 
backward-looking accounts of tort law.  After showing why the non-
consequentialist’s argument fails, the Article will then provide its own, 
different, explanation for why it is not plausible to hold the murky corrective 
justice substantive notion for both the forward-looking and backward-
looking accounts of tort.   
 
1. The first difficulty for non-consequentialist arguments 
 
Let’s consider one position often articulated by corrective justice 
theorists.  Suppose one’s backward-looking substantive view of wrongful 




conduct is the murky, somewhat undefined, but allegedly intuitively 
understood notion of wrongful conduct articulated by many corrective justice 
theorists.  Taking this as the substantive notion of wrongful conduct, the 
complementary substantive notion of societal goals, as discussed above, 
would seemingly be to minimize the number of (and severity of) occurrences 
of wrongful conduct (and maximize the occurrence of non-wrongful conduct) 
in the future.  Theorists who maintain the backward-looking view just 
mentioned, however, will often deny this complementary forward-looking 
view, and they do this for the following reason: It is often objected to their 
view that if, in fact, corrective justice is valuable, this is because of the fact 
that it is bad for there to be wrongs that go without redress, and, if this were 
the case, it certainly would be the case that it would be good to actively 
choose to not carry out corrective justice for a person whose right has been 
violated if this will have the forward-looking effect of preventing, say, five 
future rights violations of the same type.124  This, however, is not something 
that these corrective justice theorists want to accept.  In support of their 
intuition that it would not be acceptable to sacrifice one person’s rights in 
order to prevent more numerous future rights violations, the corrective justice 
theorist will offer a scapegoating example of the sort described above, in 
Parts II.B and III.B. 
According to corrective justice theorists in this camp, this forward-
looking view that is allegedly the complement of their backward-looking 
view is not acceptable because, they say, it would erode their backward-
looking view of rights and corrective justice.125  The result of maintaining the 
forward-looking view of minimizing rights violations would give rise to, in 
the words of Robert Nozick, a “utilitarianism of rights.”126  In other words, 
one person’s rights could be traded off against the rights of others, and these 
utilitarian-style tradeoffs and aggregations would defeat the very purpose of 
a right and render rights non-existent—or at least render the notion of rights 
self-contradictory.  Some authors have argued that possible theories 
consistent with this account—one of which is Amartya Sen’s theory of “goal 
rights”127—would be a plausible middle ground between utilitarian theories 
and traditional rights theories, but, as many theorists have argued, and 
successfully so, the prospects for articulating plausible foundations for 
accounts of this sort are doubtful at best.  
                                                
124  There are a variety of similar views, some of which are more nuanced than 
others.  For further discussion of these issues, and views of this sort, see for example 
F.M. Kamm, Harming Some to Save Others, 57 PHIL. STUD.: AN INT’L J. FOR PHIL. 
IN THE ANALYTIC TRADITION 227–60 (1989); Judith J. Thomson, The Trolley 
Problem, 94 YALE L.J. 1395–1415 (1985).  
125  See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 6. 
126  ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 28 (1974).  
127  Amartya Sen, Rights and Agency, 11 PHIL. AND PUB. AFFAIRS. 3 (1982).  
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Thus, these corrective justice theorists who are committed to redressing 
rights violations and who deny the forward-looking complement to their 
view will be proponents of non-consequentialist moral theories—theories for 
which factors related to consequences of an action might be relevant to the 
permissibility of an action but for which factors unrelated to consequences 
can be relevant as well.  A non-consequentialist seemingly would have two 
options.  First, he might adopt the “side-constraint”128 view, according to 
which one should strive to bring about the best results, but one’s permissible 
actions are limited by side-constraints—among them, for example, the 
constraint that one not violate a person’s right, even if doing so would lead to 
fewer rights violations of the same type in the future.  Despite the fact that 
this view has many adherents, it is rife with difficulties in handling 
objections, and thus it is difficult to take this type of view seriously.  For 
example, what could possibly ground a non-consequentialist’s belief that it is 
valuable to redress one instance of a rights violation that is unopposed, but 
not think that it is good to violate one person’s right to prevent five, one 
hundred, or two million rights violations that would otherwise occur?  Side 
constraints on action are not plausible absent instrumental benefits that they 
bring about, but if there are instrumental benefits, then the justification of the 
side constraints resides elsewhere and something else is doing the moral 
work.  
A second option for the non-consequentialist is to not adopt side 
constraints, but rather to adopt the more extreme view that consequences are 
not just one factor among many relevant to assessing the goodness of an act, 
but rather, that they are not at all relevant to determining the goodness of an 
act.  This view is even more implausible, though, both because of the 
difficulty in denying consequences any value at all and because of the 
difficulty in explaining, in a framework of this sort, how we do know which 
actions are good, and what it is that makes these actions good if not their 
consequences. 
Furthermore, despite the serious contradictions and objections that 
plague non-consequentialist accounts in the moral sphere, they are even less 
plausible in the legal sphere—including in tort law—where policies are more 
easily seen in terms merely of their consequences and where the actor in 
question is not an individual agent, but, rather, the state.  The law exists, in 
large part, because we are unable to rely on agents to always do what is 
moral or what will lead to the best result, and thus, the law is an institution 
that uses its machinery to bring about certain results.  Further, the law has to 
balance various practical concerns, and there is good reason, for example, 
and despite Seana Shiffrin’s pleas to the contrary, for specific performance 
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not to be the default remedy for contract breach, and for other alleged 
divergences law and morality.129 
Ultimately, there will be parties who staunchly cling to their non-
consequentialist views and there will be an impasse that arises in the debate.  
The non-consequentialist will continue to deny the forward-looking view that 
corresponds to his backward-looking view, and thus he will likely not get on 
board with the bulk of the claims made in this Article.  Little more can be 
said here and it will be left for the reader to judge.  The points made here, 
however, aim to show that the non-consequentialist does not have a coherent 
account of what has intrinsic value.  
 
2. The second difficulty for non-consequentialist arguments 
 
As mentioned above, the non-consequentialist corrective justice theorist 
rejects the forward-looking substantive complement to his backward-looking 
view (in part) on the basis that it is inconsistent with his backward-looking 
notion of rights.  Importantly, however, this forward-looking view will only 
be inconsistent with this theorist’s backward-looking rights view if there are 
cases where the two diverge.  What this theorist is concerned about is the 
possibility that the forward-looking view would prescribe a decision 
violating one person’s right in order to prevent more numerous future rights 
violations.  This, however, would not be a problem if it were the case that 
there never were any cases where the backward-looking view and its 
forward-looking complement had different prescriptions.  Furthermore, this 
is precisely what this Article has argued is the case.  As argued in the prior 
section, why should we believe that there would in fact be any cases where 
the backward-looking view’s prescription would bring about anything but the 
incentives associated with minimizing rights violations in the future as well?  
The common example given to support this point is the scapegoat example, 
which, to repeat, states: “Deterring cheapest cost-avoiders from committing 
future harms is no more imposing justified liability in tort than hanging the 
innocent to deter future crimes is imposing justified criminal punishment.”130 
As discussed in Part III.B, despite its vividness in conveying the 
unattractiveness of scapegoating, the example of an innocent man being 
hanged to deter future crime131 is not an instance of divergence between the 
law’s backward-looking prescriptions and its forward-looking prescriptions.  
The scapegoating example addresses a related, but different, question: 
                                                
129  See Seana Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contact and Promise, 120 HARV. L. 
REV. 708 (2007).  Contra Barbara Fried, What’s Morality Got to Do With It?, 120 
HARV. L. REV. 53 (2007) (offering a direct response in this reply piece to Shiffrin’s 
article). 
130  Keating, supra note 3, at 10.         
131  This example is attributable to Keating, Rawls, and countless others.  See 
supra Part I.B. 
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Should the judicial system’s actions on the whole be forward-looking?  The 
scapegoating case is not an instance of the criminal law adhering to forward-
looking prescriptions.  The judicial system is not declaring that an act is 
illegal if it leads to worse welfare for future members of society.  In fact, the 
judicial system in the scapegoating case is not declaring anything at all that 
the scapegoat has done to be illegal.  The system is merely making people 
believe that a particular act—that was and is illegal—was in fact committed.  
While this question of whether a judicial system’s actions on the whole 
should be forward-looking is related to the question of whether the law itself 
should be forward-looking, as discussed in Part III.B, the two are importantly 
distinct.  Thus, the key point here is that it is not obvious that there would be 
any cases where the law itself would further the backward-looking murky 
corrective justice notion of wrongful conduct while not also furthering its 
forward-looking complement—of minimizing future occurrences of 
wrongful conduct—and vice versa.  Further, as already discussed,132 there are 
positive reasons to believe that the two might always either both obtain or 
both not obtain but never be the case that one obtains while the other does 
not.  
If these points are correct, this corrective justice theorist with non-
consequentialist leanings or allegiances might still maintain that it is only the 
backward-looking aspect of tort law that has intrinsic value.  He might 
maintain that tort still is not intrinsically forward-looking, either because the 
forward-looking result is a mere collateral benefit, or because it is irrelevant 
to tort, and thus not even a benefit at all.  If this is the position taken, it seems 
that we can at least hang our hat on the fact that the forward-looking aspect 
of tort would be coextensive with the backward-looking aspect, even if it is 
denied that the forward-looking aspect is of intrinsic value.  Further, as 
discussed in the prior section, there are reasons to have strong doubts about 
whether this theorist could coherently and plausibly maintain the backward-
looking value that he posits without finding this forward-looking result to be 
intrinsically valuable.  
 
3. Why the murky corrective-justice-based account nevertheless fails 
 
It has been argued, here in Part IV.A, that the non-consequentialist 
arguments given above do not successfully give us reason to doubt the claim 
that the forward-looking and backward-looking accounts of tort law are both 
of intrinsic value and that the substantive account of each is the murky 
corrective justice notion.  This notwithstanding, a different reason can be 
given for why this backward-looking / forward-looking pair of substantive 
views is not plausible—and this is the case even if one leaves aside the 
consequentialist / non-consequentialist debate.  The reason is as follows: 
                                                
132  See supra Part III.B. 




Although the murky corrective justice notion of wrongful conduct might be 
plausible, it seems that the murky corrective justice notion does not provide a 
plausible substantive notion of forward-looking societal goals.  
It seems that our substantive notion of forward-looking value must either 
be happiness or some complex good of which happiness is an important 
component.  Despite the importance of minimizing rights violations, this 
does not seem to be something that has intrinsic value for us.  All else equal, 
it certainly seems to be a good thing to minimize rights violations (however 
we want to specify this term’s meaning), but it seems to be only one 
component of good state of affairs in the future—and thus, one that could be 
outweighed by combinations of various other factors, including but not 
limited to happiness, or perhaps equality, or some broader scale values.133  It 
isn’t difficult to think of possible pairs of future states of affairs, one of 
which is comprised of people who are miserable but includes no rights 
violations, and the other which is a much happier state of affairs—even a 
pareto improvement,134 and perhaps there is also greater equality between 
welfare and resources of different individuals in society—but where there are 
some, if not many, “rights violations.”  In such a case we would surely prefer 
the second society despite it giving rise to rights violations.  As such, it 
cannot be that minimizing rights violations is a plausible substantive account 
of our forward-looking societal goals.  Interestingly, this same concern will 
arise below, in Part V, with regard to other attempts to articulate substantive 
accounts of a forward goal that are anything other than the maximization of 
happiness—even if they are described in utilitarian-based or efficiency-based 
terms.  
One might, however, object to the idea that the rights-based substantive 
notion of wrongful conduct / societal goals actually is plausible, even if all of 
the above comments are correct.  How could this be?  One might say that this 
is because the forward-looking rights based societal goal, as a matter of fact, 
would perfectly track, say, the forward-looking happiness-based efficiency 
goal, and if these two did not diverge from one another, then the current 
account would in fact be plausible.  This is a reasonable point to make, but, 
as the next section explains, the forward-looking happiness goal and the 
forward-looking rights minimization goal would not in fact be coextensive.  
                                                
133  Various accounts of “broader scale values” have been articulated in the 
literature.  One such example would be the value that prioritarianism places on 
improving the plight of the worst off.  See, e.g., Richard Arneson, Luck 
Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism, 110 ETHICS 339 (2000); Michael Otsuka & 
Alex Voorhoeve, Why It Matters that Some Are Worse Off than Others: An 
Argument against the Priority View, 37 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 171 (2009); Derek Parfit, 
Equality and Priority, 1 RATIO 202 (1997). 
134  A state of affairs, s1, constitutes a pareto improvement over a different state of 
affairs, s2, if at least one person is better off in s1 than they are in s2, and if not a 
single person is worse off in s1 than in s2. 
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B. The Efficiency-Based Substantive Account 
 
It has been argued that, if we hold the substantive notions of wrongful 
conduct / societal goals fixed, forward-looking and backward-looking 
accounts would be coextensive.  The next question was whether, in light of 
this, there were in fact any substantive notions for which the forward-looking 
/ backward-looking pair would accurately depict our actual views, and 
whether the pair would be generally plausible.  It was argued above135 that 
the murky corrective justice notion of substantive wrongful conduct would 
not fit the bill, because, while it might accurately characterize our backward-
looking value, it does not accurately characterize our forward-looking value 
or a forward-looking value that we might plausibly or reasonably endorse.  
The question now is whether a happiness-based efficiency view would be a 
substantive notion that could be plausible for both the forward-looking and 
backward-looking aspects.  This section argues that this substantive notion 
does not fit the bill either, because while it might accurately characterize our 
forward-looking value, it does not accurately characterize our backward-
looking value.  
 
1. What an efficiency-based substantive account would look like 
 
As argued in the prior section, in explaining the murky corrective justice 
substantive notion’s failure to satisfactorily depict our forward-looking view, 
it seems that what a forward-looking view of tort law should take as a 
societal goal is happiness-based efficiency—i.e., striving to maximize future 
happiness.  Of course, this can be quantified in various ways and there might 
be both factual and various types of theoretical disagreement about how to 
further this goal.  This notwithstanding, it seems hard to argue with the claim 
that the law’s forward-looking goal should be to maximize happiness.  
What would a law that strives to maximize happiness going forward look 
like?  As discussed earlier, it would take an approach analogous to the 
approach that the murky corrective justice theory’s substantive notion would 
take:136 It would pin liability on parties for taking actions that violate the 
substantive notion of wrongful conduct, and in this case that will mean 
liability will be pinned on individuals who “act selfishly” by not taking the 
interest of others sufficiently into account, or more precisely, it will be 
pinned on individuals who take actions that lead to net disutility.  The 
thought is this will force parties to internalize the externalities that they 
would otherwise impose, and thus incentivize them to act efficiently.137 
                                                
135  See supra Part IV.A. 
136  Id. 
137  As such, a legal standard of this sort would thus bear great resemblance to 
Learned Hand’s famous formula (“The Hand Theorem”). See United States v. 




But what, precisely, will be the letter of the law?  In the case of the 
murky corrective justice notion of wrongs, the idea seemed to be that liability 
would exist for the violation of certain “rights.”  These rights could be 
written into the law (be it in statutes or even in common law opinions) in 
various ways and with the possibility of varying levels of abstractions.  
Rights could be as specific as “It is one’s right to not have one’s car 
vandalized in one’s driveway” or as broad as “It is one’s right to not have 
one’s property interfered with.”  In the case of the happiness-based efficiency 
standard, though, there simply is no rule other than “Do what is most 
efficient.”  People certainly might adopt rules of thumb in determining how 
to act—e.g., “Torturing someone generally is an inefficient activity”—just as 
act utilitarian’s138 will often have rules of thumb that they use (be it 
consciously or unconsciously) in determining whether an action is right or 
wrong.139  Similarly, courts might have rules of thumb that they use to aid 
their decisions in particular cases.  As a result of this, the efficiency-based 
law might appear to resemble a rights-based law.  This notwithstanding, 
however, the difference is great: On the rights-based law, the rights are not 
mere rules of thumb, but they are determinative.  On the efficiency-based 
law, however, the law still remains “Do what is most efficient,” and thus a 
full analysis of what was most efficient is required—i.e., the rules of thumb 
are merely rules of thumb and are only meant to aid the analysis.140 
 
                                                                                                               
Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).  The Hand Theorem, however, 
unlike the current standard, was generally formulated in monetary terms.  While the 
Hand Theorem is not used particularly frequently, it does show its face—at least 
implicitly—from time to time.   
138  An act utilitarian is one who holds that the goodness of every single act is 
determined by the amount of happiness it brings about, and the best act is the one 
that brings about the most happiness.  
139  For a discussion of different approaches a utilitarian might take to “rules of 
thumb,” see JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (1861).  
140  It’s important to recall, throughout this discussion, the clarification made in 
Part III.C: Even though judges in the system being described are performing 
efficiency analyses, the analysis here is different from the analysis that would be 
carried about by a judge whose job was to further the forward-looking aspect of the 
government or legal system on the whole—as opposed to the judge’s job here in the 
case being discussed, which is to hold a party liable for violating justice-as-
efficiency.  In the case here, the judge’s inquiry is an efficiency analysis, but an 
analysis into the efficiency of the defendant’s act in question.  If the judge’s task 
were to further the forward-looking aspect of the government or legal system on the 
whole, the analysis would still be an efficiency analysis, but an analysis into whether 
it would be an efficient act for the court to hold the defendant liable.  This analysis 
might involve, as a component, the analysis into the efficiency of the defendant’s act, 
but it need not necessarily involve this.  Further, even if it did involve this, many 
other components might be involved as well. 
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2. Objections to the forward-looking efficiency account 
 
Various objections can be raised against the forward-looking aspect of 
the efficiency account (before getting to the more serious objections that 
afflict the backward-looking aspect of the efficiency account).  For one, one 
might worry that in some tort suits neither party has violated justice-as-
efficiency, and it is a third-party that is the cheapest cost-avoider (be it in 
happiness terms, or, more tangibly in economic terms, where economic terms 
are ultimately proxies for happiness).  Perhaps a motorcycle manufacturer is 
actually the cheapest cost-avoider of an accident, resulting in a suit between 
the drivers of two vehicles that have collided.  If so, this does not pose a 
serious threat to the justice-as-efficiency account, because this third party 
could have been sued.  Further, even if a third party is the most egregious 
violator of justice-as-efficiency, this does not mean that neither of the two 
drivers has also violated justice-as-efficiency.  This party who is a mild 
violator could then choose to join the manufacturer to the suit.  
Other interesting questions and potential objections to the justice-as-
efficiency account arise in the context of collective action problems.  
Consider, for example, a typical case of a collective action problem: 
overfishing in the commons.  Suppose that a society will be better off if the 
commons is not overfished because this will allow the fish species (in the 
relevant location) to reproduce enough to prevent the species from dying out, 
and this in turn will benefit the society by enabling them to continue to enjoy 
the fish for years to come.  This notwithstanding, suppose that the choice of 
any one fisherman to go fishing on a particular day to provide his family and 
friends141 with fish will be an efficient one, because it will bring about great 
benefit to them and this action alone will not have large enough 
consequences to have any effect on whether the species dies out.  The 
concern here is that, if the facts are as stipulated, justice-as-efficiency will 
hold that there should be no liability triggered by the fisherman going 
fishing, and further, it would be tortious for him not to go fishing.  This 
might be concerning because the most efficient result would actually be 
brought about if no one goes fishing (or at least for the time-being, while the 
fish population is regrown), and a component of this course of action is this 
fisherman not going fishing.  In other words, he would be held liable for 
carrying out a necessary component of the most efficient outcome and he 
would be non-liable if he fails to do so.  
Though seemingly problematic, however, justice-as-efficiency gets the 
right results.  Nothing in the justice-as-efficiency account is incompatible 
with there also being other laws—be they statutory or non-statutory—that 
                                                
141  To simplify this example, we are supposing that the beneficiary of his fishing 
trip will be his friends and family, but not himself.  This simplifies matters because 
cases where a party acts inefficiently, but where the harm caused is solely to oneself, 
raise additional issues. 




govern behavior.  Thus, what is required in the case of collective action 
problems often is a blanket rule that does not leave room for weighing costs 
and benefits on a case-by-case basis.  It’s true that a (non-tort) law that 
outlaws the relevant amount of fishing will likely not change the fact that it 
would be efficient in the above cases to fish, but it could be that this statute 
would preempt tort law in matters it governs.  Regardless of how these 
details are worked out, however, the important point here is that issues raised 
by collective action problems are broad and wide-ranging, and they do not 
uniquely pose difficulties and interesting issues for the justice-as-efficiency 
account.  Similar issues afflict other accounts, and thus, the collective action 
issue is somewhat orthogonal to that of justice-as-efficiency.  This 
notwithstanding, it is an important topic that merits considerable further 
exploration. 
Although numerous details regarding the forward-looking aspect of the 
efficiency account still need to be worked out, the general framework seems 
to make some sense.  The difficulties arise when we look at the plausibility 
of the backward-looking account that takes the substantive notion of 
wrongful behavior to be behavior that is inefficient with respect to happiness.  
It seems as though the backward-looking aspect of justice-as-efficiency, in 
many ways, does not accurately depict our moral intuitions.  And, to clarify, 
if the backward-looking aspect of wrongful conduct does not match our 
intuitions about wrongful conduct, this shows that a tort law regime of this 
sort would have backward-looking disvalue.  In other words, the net result in 
happiness for society as a whole (including the litigants and third parties) 
that is derived not from incentive effects brought about the decision, but 
rather by sentiments regarding the appropriateness of the judgment in the 
case at hand would be negative.  
 
3. An objection to the backward-looking efficiency account 
 
It is worth first mentioning one concern that one might have, but which is 
not as problematic as it appears.  One might say that the backward-looking 
aspect of justice-as-efficiency fails to match our moral intuition about what 
constitutes wrongful conduct for the following reason: The justice-as-
efficiency standard would render a party liable for bringing about a 
suboptimal result in terms of happiness, but our moral intuitions regarding 
wrongfulness and blame generally incorporate a mental state requirement of 
some sort—be it intent, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence, depending 
on the facts, and possibly a sliding scale consisting of each of these states to 
different degrees.  If so, one might thus think that the divergence between 
one’s moral intuition and justice-as-efficiency tort liability would occur both 
when one has reason to think that one’s action (or omission) has expected 
harm but where no harm results, and, similarly, when one has reason to think 
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that one’s action (or omission) has no expected harm, but where harm does in 
fact result.  
Despite its appearances, however, this objection is easily handled.  First, 
in describing the forward-looking aspect of justice-as-efficiency, it was 
ambiguous to refer to liability-triggering actions as ones that are inefficient.  
More precisely, an inefficient action, for our purposes, should be defined not 
as one that leads to a suboptimal result, but one for which the expected 
results, given the party’s knowledge, were suboptimal.  In fact, in most cases, 
it is this definition—and not the one regarding actual results—that will be 
what actually operates on people’s incentives and affects their actions in the 
shadow of the law, thus effectively carrying out the forward-looking societal 
goal.  Thus, this takes care of the second of the two alleged types of cases of 
divergence.  The case where an agent acts with the belief that there is 
expected harm, but where he gets lucky and no harm results is a more 
complicated case, and here there does seem to be a divergence.  It is a fact 
about tort law, however, as opposed to criminal law, that a case requires 
actual harm on the part of the plaintiff, and thus tort law is about the losses to 
plaintiffs rather than gains to tortfeasors (defined in one way or another, 
including acting in a risky manner and thus avoiding the cost of precautions).  
Whether this aspect of tort law is defensible and desirable is an important 
question, but one that is a topic for another article and which need not (and, 
cannot, in light of space limitations) concern us here.  It need not concern us 
here because this issue does not uniquely affect this discussion regarding tort 
law.  All discussions of the backward-looking aspect of tort law focus on 
cases where a party suffers harm. 
The first prong of the two general concerns above was that a backward-
looking justice-as-efficiency account, if it has any hope of matching our 
intuitions, must have a mental-state requirement of some sort, and it seemed 
as though the forward-looking aspect might not.  This objection was handled 
by pointing out that the forward-looking account would include a mental-
state requirement and focus on expected results.  This also handles a specific 
instance of this general objection that is worth mentioning—both because it 
raises interesting issues and because it could have been raised as a concern 
not only about the compatibility of forward-looking and backward-looking 
accounts, but about the plausibility and workability of a forward-looking 
justice-as-efficiency account even on its own, leaving aside compatibility 
concerns.  The concern is as follows: If the forward-looking aspect focused 
only on results and not on expected results, it isn’t clear what would qualify 
as the optimal result, because it wouldn’t be clear what the relevant options 
to assess would be.  There are an infinite number of possible actions that 
could be taken at any point, and with an infinite number of (unpredictable 
and remote) results.142  It would be unclear how the relevant possible actions 
                                                
142  For an extremely provocative discussion on this topic, and for an argument 
that these and related issues are reason to abandon consequentialist moral theories, 




and results could be constrained.  In most cases we would not want to hold a 
party liable for failing to think of a better idea.  We wouldn’t think a 
motorcycle manufacturer should be held liable for failing to invent a tire that 
doesn’t skid, or—even more extreme—for discovering a new truth about 
quantum mechanics that would have enabled him to design such a tire.  
Further, there is no such thing as one best idea; one could always conceive of 
one that would yield even better results.  Without some sort of mental state 
requirement, it’s unclear that a non-arbitrary constraint of the relevant 
options, actions, and results could be articulated.  
Thus, by including a mental state-requirement and focusing on expected 
results, we avoid the above concerns about a forward-looking efficiency-
based account (problems that would exist even leaving aside compatibility 
concerns).  And, more generally, we at least give the efficiency-based 
substantive account a fighting chance of compatibility, because not only is 
the forward-looking account now workable, but it matches the backward-
looking account by including a mental-state requirement, and thus avoids one 
potential divergence.  As a practical matter, however, a forward-looking 
expected value efficiency-based account would give rise to some potential 
concerns.  For one, there would be many tricky evidentiary issues regarding 
the proof of an alleged tortfeasor’s mental state—proving both what he took 
to be the different possible actions available to him, and also what he took 
the expected values of the different actions to be.  These issues, however, 
while interesting, do not really appear to be different in type from issues that 
arise elsewhere in the law.  Further, these issues might not differ in degree of 
complexity or intractability either.  As such, though these practical concerns 
are important to note, they do not appear to be overly problematic.  
As will be discussed below, however, we are still far from showing that 
there is a plausible account of tort that takes happiness-based efficiency as its 
substantive notion of wrongful conduct / societal goals for both the forward-
looking and backward-looking aspects.  
 
4. Why the efficiency-based account fails 
 
The real problem with the happiness-based efficiency account of tort 
law, however, is that its backward-looking aspect does not seem to 
sufficiently track our intuitions regarding wrongful conduct—even if it might 
do so to some extent.  The divergence here between general moral intuitions 
and the backward-looking efficiency account corresponds directly to a cluster 
of related objections that have famously been leveled against utilitarian 
moral theorists.  This should come as no surprise in light of the fact that 
utilitarianism states that an agent is acting wrongfully if he does not do what 
he believes will maximize happiness, and this is precisely what the 
                                                                                                               
see James Lenman, Consequentialism and Cluelessness, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 342 
(2000). 
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backward-looking happiness-based efficiency account of tort law is stating as 
well.143  
The most famous of these objections is known as the “over-
demandingness” objection, and it was introduced by Bernard Williams in 
Utilitarianism: For and Against.144  According to this objection, 
utilitarianism does not provide a plausible account of morality because it 
requires too much of us.145  If every single dollar we have could bring more 
happiness to the world if donated to charity than if we spent it on ourselves, 
utilitarianism would say that it is immoral to spend a single dollar on oneself.  
This, say the proponents of the objection, is far too demanding of a moral 
standard.146  This is the crux of the objection, but it can be further described 
and elaborated upon in at least two (related) ways: by appealing to negative 
responsibility and by appealing to alienation.   
According to Williams, part of what is problematic about the over-
demandingness of utilitarianism is the fact that it imposes “negative 
responsibility” on agents.147  According to Williams, utilitarianism goes 
wrong by failing to take into account the consideration that “each of us is 
specially responsible for what he does, rather than for what other people 
do.”148  It would be the implication of utilitarianism that not only must one 
behave appropriately generally within one’s own sphere, but that one must 
do what one can to either prevent others from acting badly or to mitigate the 
effects of the bad actions of others.149  This constitutes “negative 
responsibility” because it is about preventing or minimizing the bad effects 
of others’ actions as opposed to merely requiring that a person simply make 
sure that he does not do something wrongly.  This, Williams thinks, is too 
intrusive, and it results in boundless obligation being imposed on agents.150  
Secondly, and relatedly, the negative responsibility that utilitarianism 
imposes on an agent is an attack on integrity, because it “alienate[s] him in a 
real sense from his actions and the source of his action in his own 
convictions.”151  Williams thinks it is “absurd to demand” of a man that he 
leave his own projects behind and that he do what a utilitarian calculus 
requires: having one’s actions largely determined by the projects of others.152  
According to Williams, this makes him simply a “janitor” of a system of 
                                                
143  See, e.g., MILL, supra note 139. 
144  See generally J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR 
AND AGAINST (1973). 
145  Id. at 99. 
146  Id. 
147  Id. at 95. 
148  Id. at 99.    
149  Id.  
150  Id.  
151  Id. at 116.    
152  Id. 




values, and prevents him from basing his actions on his own decisions, 
projects, and attitudes—in other words, utilitarianism alienates people from 
themselves.153 
There is also another problem that is raised for utilitarianism that is an 
offshoot of the over-demandingness objection (though one that merits its 
own mention): utilitarianism’s alleged inability to accommodate our 
commonsense notion of supererogation.  In his 1958 article, Saints and 
Heroes, J.O. Urmson called our attention to the fact that the traditional 
threefold classification of actions—duties, wrongs, and the permissible but 
not morally required—is “totally inadequate to the facts of morality” because 
of its inability to accommodate supererogatory acts.154  According to 
Urmson, supererogatory acts are acts that go beyond what duty requires.155  
As such, they are morally optional and it is not blameworthy to fail to 
perform the act, yet at the same time, the performance of the act has moral 
worth.156  According to Urmson, moral theories must be amended to allow 
for the possibility of supererogatory acts.157  The problem, however, is that 
utilitarianism (as compared to other moral theories) seems to have particular 
difficulty accommodating supererogation.158  The difficulty that 
utilitarianism has in accommodating supererogatory intuitions stems from the 
same feature of utilitarianism that gives rise to the over-demandingness 
objection to utilitarianism.  According to classical utilitarianism, one is 
acting wrongly unless one brings about the best possible result in utilitarian 
terms.159  As such, if the duty utilitarianism imposes on agents is to bring 
about the best possible result in utilitarian terms, it seems as though there is 
no room for supererogatory actions—actions that go above and beyond duty.  
The bar has already been set at the top.  This, it seems, is problematic, 
because people generally have the intuition that a class of supererogatory 
actions does exist.  
                                                
153  Id. at 118.  For thought-provoking replies to Williams’s arguments, see, e.g., 
Frank Jackson, Decision-Theoretic Consequentialism and the Nearest and Dearest 
Objection, 101 ETHICS 461 (1991); Peter Railton, Alienation, Consequentialism, and 
the Demands of Morality, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 134 (1984). 
154  J.O. Urmson, Saints and Heroes, in ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY, 198–99 
(A. I. Melden, ed., 1958). 
155  See id. at 201. 
156  See id. at 202–03. 
157  Id. at 205. 
158  Other authors, however, think that utilitarianism is not alone in having this 
difficulty and think that this problem afflicts some if not all other moral theories as 
well.  See, e.g., Susan Wolf, Moral Saints, 79 THE J. OF PHIL. 419 (1982).  For a 
discussion of other authors still, including the author of this Article, who believe that 
there might be hope for utilitarianism in accommodating supererogation, see infra 
Part IV.C.1.  
159  See, e.g., MILL, supra note 139. 
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Lastly, and related to but somewhat distinct from the various concerns 
above, another concern that one might have about the ability of the 
backward-looking justice-as-efficiency account to track our intuitions of 
wrongful conduct is the fact that one might find legal or moral intervention in 
certain areas of one’s life to be overly intrusive and inappropriate.  In other 
words, one might not only find it to be inappropriate for the law to meddle in 
certain personal matters (even if one’s actions or one’s family or friends’ 
actions are inefficient), but one might even find it to be the case that there are 
some domains where one does not think that morality should provide 
judgments either.   
Related to this, a concern that might arise is that there simply would be 
too many tort claims if the legal standard were justice-as-efficiency.  Almost 
every single thing that one would do could likely be found tortious because 
there would exist better alternatives that are available yet forgone.  Some of 
these alternatives could be significantly better than the chosen option, but in 
the majority of cases there will be very little hedonic difference between 
one’s action and the action that one inefficiently forwent.  For example, we 
wouldn’t want there to be a tort claim if a person eats a piece of candy rather 
than offering it to his colleague or spouse who would derive more pleasure 
from it than he would.  These concerns, however, would not prove fatal to a 
justice-as-efficiency legal standard.  For one, it could be handled by the 
equivalent of an “amount-in-controversy” requirement for suits to be 
brought.  Further, this likely would not even be necessary, because just as 
does happen in our legal system today, people only go forward with litigation 
if the expected benefit exceeds the expected attorneys fees and court fees that 
one would incur if one brought a case to court.  Thus, while interesting 
questions would arise in connection with these issues,160 they do not amount 
to serious problems for the justice-as-efficiency account—unlike the various 
difficulties described earlier in this section, which most certainly do.   
In sum, the problem with the justice-as-efficiency substantive account is 
that its account of backward-looking value—i.e., wrongfulness equal to 
violations of justice-as-efficiency—in general does not fully track our 
intuitions.  We generally think that there is a realm in which we are allowed 
to act with our own best interests in mind even if other actions would bring 
about greater happiness for the world on the whole.  We do not think it is 
                                                
160  Perhaps one of the most important practical questions that confronts a 
happiness-based legal standard is what the remedies would like.  Presumably the 
most efficient form of remedy would be damages—though perhaps various equitable 
remedies might work well too.  With respect to damages, there would be important 
questions that would need to be addressed about how to translate inefficient behavior 
in terms of happiness into monetary sums.  This also subsumes questions about how 
to quantify hedonic values.  Neither of these questions is a stranger to our legal 
system, though, as monetary sums are awarded for non-financial loss such as 
emotional distress and pain and suffering. 




wrongful to allow ourselves to pursue our own goals with greater fervency 
and give our own welfare—and that of our nearest and dearest—special 
attention.  Even an economist is likely to think that there is some realm of 
“selfishness” that is not wrongful.  
 
5. A different description of the efficiency account’s problem 
 
There is one additional point worth discussing here with regard to the 
backward-looking notion of justice-as-efficiency.  As discussed at various 
places earlier in this article, the backward-looking value is the value of 
corrective justice.161  This backward-looking value is the value that is 
brought about to litigants or to third parties due to sentiments regarding the 
fairness or appropriateness of the court’s decision.  This, in turn, is due to the 
value that people attribute to averting a disturbance of—and, likewise, 
bringing about a return to—the equilibrium dictated by distributive justice.  
As discussed in Part I.B, the notion of corrective justice doesn’t necessitate 
any particular theory of distributive justice, but it does rely on the fact that 
there is a notion of distributive justice that renders the return to this 
equilibrium, brought about by corrective justice, valuable.   
When discussing the murkier intuitive substantive notion of corrective 
justice, it didn’t seem particularly necessary to question what this pre-
disturbance and post-redress distributive justice equilibrium amounted to, 
because it seemed reasonable to assume that a plausible account of some sort 
could be articulated if need be.  Here, in the context of justice-as-efficiency 
as the backward-looking substantive account, it seems to be more important 
to indicate what such an equilibrium would amount to, because justice-as-
efficiency seems to suggest that the distributive justice equilibrium would 
have to be quite different from typical accounts of distributive justice.  
According to the justice-as-efficiency account, corrective justice is 
required when a person does not do what he perceives to be the maximally 
efficient action.  Thus, it seems that the equilibrium that corrective justice 
returns us to is not one where parties to the action are returned to a particular 
level of resources or happiness where they were before the wrongful action 
occurred.  In many cases there seemingly would be a windfall gain for the 
party upon whom some benefit could have been efficiently conferred, and a 
windfall loss for the party that could have conferred the benefit.  
Furthermore, it wouldn’t necessarily be the case that these unexpected gains 
and losses would even out due to being “repeat players” in these situations of 
life.  It could well be the case that a particular individual would continue to 
find himself in situations where he could, at large cost to himself, confer 
efficient benefits on others, and similarly there could be another individual 
who, by the luck of the draw, might repeatedly find himself in situations 
                                                
161  See supra Part III. 
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where he could efficiently have a benefit conferred upon him by someone 
else.  As such, one might say that this notion of corrective justice could add 
great disturbances to an equilibrium defined in terms of resources or 
happiness.   
As a practical matter, though, these types of situations could potentially 
be avoided, or at least minimized, by tweaking the way these suits work.  
Perhaps it could be that a suit of this sort would not necessarily result in a 
defendant losing the sum equivalent to the benefit that could have been 
conferred on the other party, and perhaps the defendant wouldn’t even lose 
the (lower) sum that he would have been required to expend to bring about 
the efficient sacrifice.  Perhaps some even lower sum could be the norm, 
though this would seemingly fail to bring about the full internalization of 
externalities—i.e., the appropriate forward-looking incentive effects.  
Regardless of what the practical details would be, when conditions permit, 
there would likely be considerable negotiation and contracting between 
potential conferrers and conferees of benefits brought about by potentially 
efficient sacrifices.162   
These potential practical patches notwithstanding, the question still 
remains what to make of the notion of the distributive justice equilibrium that 
must lie beneath the justice-as-efficiency notion of corrective justice.  This 
will not be fleshed out in detail here, but it seems that the answer is that the 
equilibrium would be one in which everyone is a steward of society’s best 
interests on the whole, and that the more frequently and severely one fails to 
carry out efficient actions, the greater one strays from one’s duties and the 
further one departs from the equilibrium.  This equilibrium is one in which 
one simply carries out one’s stewardship and gets the luck of the draw in 
terms of how many resources and how much happiness one accrues during 
one’s lifetime.  Though this notion of a distributive justice equilibrium is not 
of the type one might tend to have in mind when thinking of a distributive 
justice equilibrium in the background of corrective justice, it is not an 
incoherent notion, and is not in and of itself a reason to reject justice-as-
efficiency.  This notwithstanding, it might very well be that the fact that it 
might strike many as counterintuitive is a direct result of the fact that justice-
as-efficiency doesn’t track our notion of wrongful conduct—or, perhaps, vice 
versa.  If so, perhaps this inquiry into the distributive justice equilibrium is a 
different, but equally good, way of addressing the question of whether 
justice-as-efficiency tracks our intuitions about backward-looking value.  
 
C. A Third Attempt to Identify a Plausible Substantive Account 
 
As discussed, our backward-looking substantive notion of wrongful 
conduct seems to be largely a murky corrective-justice-based substantive 
                                                
162  For further discussion of appropriate quantities for remedies and the 
appropriate severity of punishments, see infra note 190 and accompanying text. 




account whereas our forward-looking substantive account seems to be largely 
efficiency-based.163 In our attempt to reconcile this apparent divergence, a 
question naturally arises: Is it really not possible for utilitarianism to make 
room for and accommodate supererogation?  Despite the apparent difficulty, 
due to the concerns raised in conjunction with the over-demandingness 
objection to utilitarianism, perhaps utilitarianism can give an account of 
supererogation.164  Further, one might think that perhaps an account of this 
sort would be able to provide a single substantive account that we might be 
able to adopt both as our backward-looking and forward-looking substantive 
accounts.  In what follows, this section will argue that utilitarianism can in 
fact accommodate supererogation.  It will argue, however, that this will not 
rescue the current divergence between our substantive forward-looking view 
and our substantive backward-looking view.  This is because the utilitarian 
account of supererogation, while either a decent description of the murky 
backward-looking view in utilitarian terms, or while perhaps a description of 
a related backward-looking view we might take, will not be able to capture 
our intuitions as a plausible forward-looking view.  Furthermore, this section 
will argue that this is the case for the same reason that the murky backward-
looking view fails to provide a plausible forward-looking view—it would 
take its goal as aiming to minimize “wrong actions” and this would often 
come at the expense of maximizing happiness, which is what would be a 
more plausible forward-looking societal goal.  This notwithstanding, 
however, the utilitarian account of supererogation offered here is both 
instructive in and of itself and in its failure to unite the two different 
substantive views.  Further, it will lay the foundations for the analysis in Part 
V.   
                  
1. How utilitarianism might be able to accommodate supererogation 
 
Recall that the challenge for utilitarianism in trying to accommodate 
supererogation is that the bar has been already set at the top.165  According to 
classical utilitarianism, one is acting wrongly unless one brings about the 
best possible result in utilitarian terms.166  As such, it seems as though there 
is no room for supererogatory actions—actions that go above and beyond 
duty.  
Despite the seeming incompatibility between utilitarianism and 
supererogation, many philosophers do not want to give up either of the two 
positions, and they thus seek ways in which to reconcile the two.  At least 
five proposals along these lines have been offered, which will be mentioned 
                                                
163  See supra Parts III and IV. 
164  See supra Part IV.B. 
165  Id.  
166  Id. 
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but not addressed in depth here: (1) Ties at the top,167 (2) Satisficing,168 (3) 
Egoistically-adjusted utilitarianism,169 (4) Self-other utilitarianism,170 and (5) 
Egoistic-adjustment self-other utilitarianism.171  While these proposals have 
their merits, they are afflicted by two difficulties: First, and most 
importantly, they exhibit great confusion regarding supererogation’s relation 
to the notion of acting to maximize total utility of all (i.e., total utility of 
everyone in the world), and its relation to the notion of acting to maximize 
utility-for-others (i.e., total utility of all other than the agent).172  They 
indicate that the notion of supererogation is a function of both, but they do 
not offer plausible accounts of how these two inputs interact and why they 
both are relevant to supererogation.173  (In other words, the question here is 
as follows: Should a supererogatory act be defined in terms of how much 
goodness it brings to the world, or in terms of how much goodness it brings 
to individuals other than the agent, or in terms of some combination of the 
two?  There appear to be examples that provide intuitive support in favor and 
against each of these three options.)  Second, these views have difficulties in 
defending the notion of a duty threshold—both in defending a particular non-
arbitrary threshold and in defending the fact that there even exists such a 
threshold.174  Thus, although these theories do contain important insights, a 
new approach is needed if utilitarianism is to successfully accommodate 
supererogation.175   
Although the question of the duty threshold is not minor, the more 
pressing problem is coming up with a coherent notion of the relationship 
between supererogation and total utility and or utility-for-others.  Once 
sufficient progress is made here, the question of the duty threshold becomes 
much easier to solve.  Supererogation, however, seems to be based on the 
notion of going beyond a particular threshold, and thus it might seem as 
though it cannot be analyzed without the threshold already fixed.  This 
approach sketched here, however, proceeds in reverse, and begins by 
analyzing what seems to be more basic than (and, in fact, one of the building 
                                                
167  See generally, e.g., MICHAEL SLOTE, BEYOND OPTIMIZING: A STUDY OF 
RATIONAL CHOICE (1989). 
168  See, e.g., Wolf, supra note 158 at 428–35. 
169 See generally, e.g., SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, THE REJECTION OF 
CONSEQUENTIALISM: A PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE CONSIDERATIONS OF 
UNDERLYING RIVAL MORAL CONSIDERATIONS (1994). 
170  See Ted Sider, Asymmetry and Self-Sacrifice, 70 PHIL. STUD. 117, 117 (1993). 
171  See Jean-Paul Vessel, Supererogation for Utilitarianism, 47 AM. PHIL. Q. 299, 
300 (2010). 
172  See, e.g., SLOTE, supra note 167. 
173  Id.  
174  See, e.g., SCHEFFLER, supra note 169; Sider, supra note 170. 
175  For a much more in depth discussion and explanation of the points and issues 
briefly described in this paragraph, see this author’s Utilitarianism and 
Supererogation (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).                                             




blocks of) the notion of supererogation: moral praise and blame.  In order to 
avoid prejudging questions regarding duty thresholds, analysis of moral 
praise and blame should take place within the framework of a scalar version 
of utilitarianism that doesn’t specify any duties, but rather, merely compares 
actions based on the goodness of the results they bring about.176   
This analysis of praise and blame serves two purposes.  First, it is a novel 
theory of moral praise and blame that might be appealing to a utilitarian.  
This, itself, will be an important achievement.  Second, this analysis of moral 
praise and blame will pave the way for a new account of supererogation.  
According to the account of moral praise (and blame) introduced here, 
we feel moral praise toward an agent neither because of the fact that he 
brings about the best result, nor because of the fact that he performs an act 
that he believes will bring about the best result.  Our feelings of moral praise 
have something to do with the notion of utility-for-others, but we don’t even 
feel moral praise because of the fact that an agent does something he believes 
will maximize utility-for-others.  Rather, we feel moral praise toward an 
agent when he performs an act that has a high value of utility-for-others, yet 
also has a low value of utility for the agent himself, thus evidencing the fact 
that the agent placed high weight on the outcome for those other than 
himself.  More specifically, what seems to be relevant is the percent weight 
one mentally attributes to the expected results for oneself and the percent 
weight one attributes to the expected results for others.  The greater the 
percent weight an agent attributes to the expected results for others, the more 
positive (and less negative) the moral feeling is toward an agent for his act.  
Thus, given an amount of suffering that an agent undergoes to bring about a 
benefit to others, although it is commonly believed that the greater the 
benefit (or expected benefit) that the agent brings about for others, the more 
the agent is praised for his act, the theory offered here states the opposite, 
and this seems to be a point in its favor.   
Having suggested that the percent an agent weights the expected utility-
for-others is the only relevant value when it comes to moral assessment of 
action, one option is for us to remain in a scalar framework and merely avail 
ourselves of comparative claims when it comes to moral praise.  While this 
would not be a bad option, it seems that this approach would still not account 
for our supererogatory intuitions.  The question then becomes: Armed with 
this single value, where should the duty threshold lie?  A number of the 
above accounts have suggested that if we opt against the merely scalar 
                                                
176  In other words, a scalar utilitarianism will compare the goodness of actions to 
each other, saying e.g., “X is a better action than Y,” but, unlike classical 
utilitarianism, it does not hold that acts are wrong if the goodness they bring about is 
below a certain threshold—a threshold at or above which an action is right, and 
below which an action is wrong.  See Alastair Norcross, The Scalar Approach to 
Utilitarianism, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO MILL’S UTILITARIANISM 217–32 
(Henry R. West ed., 2006).  
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framework and seek a duty threshold, then it must be a fixed threshold on the 
spectrum of the value(s) in question.177  However, any attempt made to 
justify a particular point as a duty threshold is an utter failure, because no 
non-arbitrary reasons are able to be provided for why this point is chosen.  
These authors have mistakenly assumed that we have a choice merely 
between the extremes of no duty threshold and a single fixed duty threshold.  
More options exist: First of all, there is no need to precisely articulate a 
particular threshold.  Second, and perhaps almost more importantly, it seems 
that in different contexts in life we might have different intuitions about 
where the threshold lies.  Thus, it could be that there is not a single threshold 
that captures all realms of our lives, and thus, by attempting to generalize and 
identify a single threshold, we are failing to take note of the fact that certain 
domains of our lives do in fact have thresholds that we might be able to 
identify if we narrow our focus.  Even a threshold of this sort might not be 
precise, but it need not be.  Though it would be nice if there were in fact a 
single threshold and a precise threshold, in locating a threshold what we are 
doing is describing our intuitions, and it should not be a surprise that our 
intuitions on matters of this sort might vary dramatically between contexts as 
different as civic air pollution and giving a meal to a homeless man on the 
street.  In sum, then, it seems that prior theorists have mistakenly assumed 
that we must have either one (precise) duty threshold or no duty threshold at 
all.178 
This certainly has only been a bare-bones sketch of this theory here, but 
the thought is that this utilitarian account of supererogation, informed by the 
prior account of moral praise and blame, avoids both sets of difficulties that 
afflict the other accommodation attempts.  The account of moral praise and 
blame provides a single metric for assessing actions and thus avoids the 
dualism of value that afflicted other accounts.  Additionally, the approach to 
the duty threshold described here, though far from complete, seems to 
constitute a promising approach that might make sense of our supererogatory 
intuitions.  As such, if a utilitarian is to accommodate supererogation, it 
seems that the account briefly sketched here describes how he should attempt 
to do so.   
 
2. The failure of the third attempt 
 
Even if the account sketched above is a plausible account of how a 
utilitarian can accommodate supererogation, this will not rescue the current 
divergence between our substantive forward-looking view and our 
substantive backward-looking view.  What the account does do is one of two 
things: First, it might be that it provides a decent account, in utilitarian terms, 
of the murky backward-looking view—thus providing a more systematic 
                                                
177  See, e.g., SCHEFFLER, supra note 169; Sider, supra note 170. 
178  See, e.g., SCHEFFLER, supra note 169; Sider, supra note 170. 




explanation of our notion of wrongful conduct.  Second, and alternatively, 
even if not quite an accurate description of the murky backward-looking 
view of wrongful conduct, it might be that it describes a plausible backward-
looking view that a utilitarian—or anyone else, for that matter—might adopt.  
The problem, however, is that this substantive account still does not bring 
about compatibility between forward-looking and backward-looking 
accounts (though it will be argued in Part V that it does constitute progress in 
this direction).  It fails to bring about compatibility because while it might 
constitute a plausible backward-looking account of wrongful conduct, it does 
not constitute a plausible forward-looking account.  This is so for the same 
reason that the murky backward-looking view does not provide us with a 
plausible forward-looking account.  A forward-looking account associated 
with the utilitarian account of supererogation would suggest that the forward-
looking societal goal would be to minimize the occurrence of actions that fall 
below the threshold that is appropriate in the context—i.e., actions that were 
deemed wrongful.  But, as discussed above in Part IV.A, this is not a 
plausible forward-looking goal unless the threshold is at the very top—
requiring maximally efficient actions.  While it would generally be a good 
thing, to minimize the occurrence of actions falling below the appropriate 
threshold, what we truly want to further for society is the maximization of 
happiness, and there will be cases where happiness maximization and the 
minimization of wrongful conduct (as defined by this account of wrongful 
conduct) do not point in the same direction.  In these cases of divergence, the 




Thus, to conclude this Part, it seems that if we were to hold a particular 
substantive account of wrongful conduct / societal goals fixed, a forward-
looking and backward-looking account would be compatible.  However, it 
turns out that, as a matter of fact, we do not subscribe to the same substantive 
views for both the forward-looking and backward-looking aspects of tort law.  
The substantive account we employ for societal goals is largely an 
efficiency-based account, whereas our substantive account of wrongful 
conduct is largely a murky corrective-justice-based substantive account that 
leaves room for some inefficient behavior to be non-wrongful.  Furthermore, 
the utilitarian account that arguably accommodates supererogation that was 
offered in Part IV.C might successfully describe and systematize our 
backward-looking view, but it seems to do no better at capturing our 
forward-looking view than does the murky corrective-justice-based 
substantive account.  
With these quasi-descriptive conclusions in hand, we now shift gears and 
confront normative questions: Is it good that this is the way things are?  And 
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if the current state of affairs is not ideal, what—if anything—might we be 
able to do to improve the situation?  Part V addresses these questions.   
 
 V.  FORMULATING THE IDEAL LEGAL STANDARD: IN THE PRESENT AND IN 
THE FUTURE 
 
At this point it should be clear that our forward-looking and backward-
looking substantive accounts are not the same.  It is important to note, 
though, that although there certainly is a divergence between the two 
substantive accounts, the divergence might not be quite as big as one might 
think.  Further, this is the case regardless of whether one adopts the murky 
backward-looking view or if one adopts the backward-looking view given by 
the utilitarian attempting to accommodate supererogation—which is either 
coextensive with or slightly different from the murky backward-looking 
view.  
The following is what seems to be the case: The things that we consider 
to be wrongful, and thus, for which there would be liability on our account of 
wrongfulness, will be both intrinsically backward-looking and intrinsically 
forward-looking.  What’s lacking is that we generally think that there should 
be additional forward-looking goals that are furthered by the law, but we 
don’t think that some or all of these things would bring about intrinsic 
backward-looking liability.  Thus, the substantive view that we seem to 
adhere to for forward-looking concerns and the one that we seem to adhere to 
for backward-looking concerns are not as far apart as they might seem.  In 
other words, rights violations that we think are wrongful are in almost all 
cases things that lower overall utility and should thus, on the forward-looking 
account, be deemed liability-triggering so as to avoid actions of this type in 
the future.  While we can certainly imagine some cases that are exceptions to 
this rule, such as cases where one has the opportunity to kill one in order to 
save five, in the vast majority of cases, providing liability for cases where we 
believe a wrong has occurred—and thus bringing about a positive backward-
looking value—will also have positive forward-looking results.  Thus, the 
real difference between our substantive backward-looking view and our 
substantive forward-looking view—the difference that is keeping them from 
being coextensive—is that the forward-looking view requires efficient 
sacrifices, the omission of which the backward-looking view does not deem 
wrongful.  In other words, the forward-looking substantive view we have 
would require greater civic-mindedness.  This notwithstanding, it is 
important to note that aside from this difference, our substantive forward-
looking and backward-looking views are otherwise very much aligned, so the 
difference between the two is not as great as one might have thought.179   
 
                                                
179  This does of course depend on just how numerous the cases of potential 
efficient sacrifices in fact are.                




A. An Assessment of the Status Quo 
 
The question now becomes whether it would be preferable for us to have 
the same substantive account for forward-looking and backward-looking 
aspects of tort.  As discussed in Part III.A, it seems that the goal for any 
society ultimately is and should be to maximize happiness in the inclusive 
forward-looking sense.  In other words, a society should strive to maximize 
the sum of backward-looking value and forward-looking value of the law.  
Further, the most plausible forward-looking account would be to maximize 
happiness even if citizens believed otherwise.  Thus, if there is no backward-
looking value at all (or if it were an efficiency-based account), having a 
narrow forward-looking system that seeks to maximize happiness will be 
what best furthers the inclusive forward-looking—or overall—goal.  This, 
however, is not the case for us.  Thus, the legal standard that will be best 
overall for us will be the one that strays from the forward-looking efficiency 
goal just enough to appease the non-completely-efficiency-based backward-
looking value.   
In other words, the further our legal standard strays from a purely 
efficiency-based account and toward a murky corrective-justice-based 
substantive notion, the more the narrow forward-looking value will decrease, 
but the more the backward-looking value will increase.  What we, as a 
society, want to maximize, however, is the sum of these two values, and thus 
the account we will use legally should be at the point between these two 
extremes that maximizes the sum of the two values.  While a curve modeling 
these values could conceivably take different shapes, it seems reasonable to 
assume that as we start to move away from the pure efficiency standard, the 
gains to the backward-looking value will be greater than the losses to the 
forward-looking value.  Further, it seems that as we get closer to a pure 
murky corrective justice substantive account, the gains to backward-looking 
value might be less than the losses to the forward-looking value.  If this is the 
case, the optimal point—where the marginal benefit and marginal cost of 
moving further in one direction are equal—will be somewhere between these 
two pure accounts.  In short, we should stray from the efficiency-based legal 
standard to the extent—and only to the extent—that it is efficient to do so.  
Thus, this presumably describes where we have come to as a society.  
Though it could be that shifts in one direction or the other would constitute a 
welfare-maximizing shift, and thus an improvement, some theories suggest 
that we might currently be at the optimal point.180   
What, then, does this mean for whether it would be good to have the 
same substantive account for the backward-looking and narrow forward-
                                                
180  See, e.g., Paul H. Rubin, Unenforceable Contracts: Penalty Clauses and 
Specific Performance, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 237 (1981) (arguing that common law 
doctrine evolves to become more and more efficient over time, thus giving rise to the 
presumption that long-standing doctrines are, cumulatively, quite efficient).  
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looking aspects?  In short, the answer is “not necessarily.”  It would be worse 
for society to shift the forward-looking aim anywhere away from maximizing 
happiness.  The overall happiness of a society will be able to best achieved, 
however, the closer its backward-looking substantive notion is to this 
forward-looking efficiency based notion.  This, as should now be apparent, is 
because the closer a society’s backward-looking substantive notion is to a 
pure efficiency-based notion, then the narrower the gap between the two 
accounts, and thus the less the actual legal standard—in seeking to maximize 
the sum of the backward-looking and forward-looking values—will have to 
stray from the pure efficiency standard. 
Thus, though having the same substantive backward-looking and 
forward-looking notion is not something we should strive for in and of itself, 
it would be beneficial to strive, as much as possible to have our backward-
looking notion approach—and ideally match—our forward-looking 
efficiency-based notion.  As is, our society’s overall welfare is hampered by 
the fact that our notion of wrongfulness is not an efficiency-based one, 
because our law must cater to these views so as to avoid too much backward-
looking disutility.  The implication of this is somewhat unsurprising.  We 
would collectively be better off if we all adopted a more civic-minded 
morality than we currently do—one which would both motivate us to make 
more “efficient sacrifices,” and one which would prevent us from feeling so 
much backward-looking disutility if a law or court decision were to hold a 
party liable for failing to make an “efficient sacrifice.”  
 
B. How We Can Improve Social Welfare 
 
While it might be the case that we are being constrained and held back 
by our moral intuitions about what is wrongful conduct, it might seem as 
though there isn’t much we can do about this.  After all, we do not seem to 
choose our moral intuitions.  However, while it does seem to be true that we 
do not choose them, it does not seem to be true that there is nothing that we 
might be able to do to influence these intuitions—be it on the level of the 
individual himself, the family, the community, or on the level of society on 
the whole, through laws or other policies.  While various approaches of these 
sorts might be possible, what follows will address the possibility of 
influencing our moral intuitions by changing the law—be it common law or 
statutory law (or corresponding administrative regulations).   
How could changes to the law bring about a change of this sort to our 
moral intuitions regarding wrongful conduct?  The relationship between law 
and morality is a complex one, a detailed analysis of which is beyond the 
scope of this Article, but a few observations are in order.  It seems that the 
law and our collective moral intuitions both have an effect on each other.181  
                                                
181  See, e.g., Fried, supra note 129; Shiffrin, supra note 129.  




On the one hand, the law is to a large extent a function of society’s moral 
views.  Of course, this is not true across the board: Various moral beliefs 
don’t make it into the law, and many laws aim to solve collective action 
problems, solve coordination problems, and codify social conventions.  
These exceptions notwithstanding, the law is in large part a function of 
morality.  On the other hand, it is also the case that our moral intuitions are to 
some extent a function of the law.  Influence in this direction can occur in at 
least two different ways, corresponding to the distinction (made in criminal 
law, though equally applicable in areas of civil law, including tort) between 
crimes that are mala prohibita (crimes that would not be wrongful if not for 
having been criminalized) and crimes that are mala in se (crimes that would 
be wrong independent of the law criminalizing them).  Thus, firstly (and 
following by definition), it might be that something is deemed wrongful 
merely because it is criminalized.  Secondly, it might be that a person’s 
moral intuitions are affected by the criminalization of a particular act, not 
because the person finds it wrongful to break the law, but because the change 
in the law makes one reflect further and determine that the act would be 
wrongful even if not for the law (though not but for the further reflection that 
it happened to bring about).   
Thus, it seems that we can aim to shift society’s morals further in the 
direction of civic-mindedness by harnessing the power of the law to affect 
morality—in both of the ways discussed above.  The mala prohibita 
mechanism for the shift might reside largely in bringing about guilt 
associated with the fact that not complying with laws would in many cases (if 
not caught) result in benefitting by free riding.  The mala in se prong 
mechanism would likely reside in a person reflecting after a law is passed 
and thinking, at a more abstract level, perhaps, that it simply is abhorrent to 
not make efficient sacrifices in certain types of contexts and that the doing-
allowing distinction is misguided. 
 Importantly, however, the goal here will not only be to change people’s 
moral intuitions, but also to change people’s views about which immoral 
actions rise to the threshold of badness meriting the intrusion by the state into 
what would otherwise be merely one’s personal affairs.  The fact that the law 
has an effect on this—and thus that a change in the law might bring about a 
change in views on this—is good for the project of change being discussed, 
not only because it is a second way in which the desired changes can be 
brought about, but because it seems that people’s views about norms about 
intrusiveness of the law into one’s life are even more likely to be easily 
affected by a change in the law than would be a person’s moral intuitions 
themselves. 
As for how the changes might be brought about, for one, it seems that 
changes would likely (though not necessarily) be best done in a gradual 
manner.  Secondly, there would have to be strategic choices made about 
which domains of life or which types of changes would best lend themselves 
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toward being changed first.  Different methods to this end could be taken.  
One possible approach would be to take advantage of the framework this 
Article offered as a utilitarian account of supererogation, and thus as an 
account of our notion of moral praise and blame.  For example, if it seems to 
be the case that—in the context of a particular type of human interaction—
we currently blame people for weighting their own welfare more than, say, 
fifty percent of the overall population, perhaps we decide not to jump straight 
to having laws holding parties liable for weighting their welfare more than 
the percentage that is equal to their percentage of the world population, but, 
rather, perhaps we institute laws that would have the effect of holding people 
liable for weighting themselves more than, say, twenty percent of the overall 
population.  In other words, we could begin by continuing to allow people to 
act “selfishly,” but by allowing them to be less “selfish” than they otherwise 
could have been before the change.  As for which types of cases would even 
fall in the domain of cases for which there would be newfound liability, there 
would be many types of cases, but a common and particularly salient one—
because of the great disparity between high gains resulting from the sacrifice 
and low costs of carrying out the sacrifice—might be the typical good 
Samaritan cases such as saving a drowning child at little cost or risk to 
oneself.  
Thus, not only is the gap between our backward-looking and forward-
looking views not enormous, but it seems as though there is reason to think 
that we might be able to make progress in closing the gap if we harness the 
power of the law to affect morality.  The closer we can bring our substantive 
backward-looking view into alignment with a forward-looking efficiency-
based substantive view, the greater our society’s potential overall welfare 
will be.  This is because the legal standard will then be able to stray less from 
the pure efficiency account in seeking to maximize the sum of the backward-
looking and forward-looking values.   
   
C. Other Factors to Consider 
 
As discussed in Part III.B, the ultimate goal is to have a society be as 
well-off as possible, and the question prior to that of “What would be the best 
laws?” is the question of “What would be the best government or legal 
regime on the whole?”182  It was suggested there that, due to considerations 
similar to those that Rawls makes,183 the best society would likely be one 
where the government operated transparently, operated with laws, and where 
people would be held liable if and only if they violated laws.  In light of this, 
but all the while keeping the broader goal in mind, we shifted our analysis to 
the question of what would be the best laws.  In other words, we have been 
looking into the question of which laws would have the best inclusive 
                                                
182  See supra Part III.B. 
183  See Rawls, supra note 72. 




forward-looking results, and the inclusive forward-looking value is the sum 
of the backward-looking value and the narrow forward-looking value (i.e., 
the value brought about by the incentives created by the law).  The inclusive 
forward-looking results of the law itself, however, while perhaps the main 
component of the forward-looking results of the government or legal regime 
on the whole, is not the only component.  Also relevant to quantifying the 
results of a government or legal regime on the whole are the effects brought 
about by the law through means other than the incentive effects of the law 
itself.  These effects could be positive or negative, and could be manifested 
in many forms.  As such, factors of this sort must be taken into consideration 
if we wish to attempt to assess a legal regime on the whole—as opposed to a 
particular law.   
One important effect that can be brought about by the law that is not due 
to its incentive effects is the effect on people’s happiness that certain levels 
of government intrusion will have.  While this could be a positive thing, a 
high level of intrusion might be particularly likely to bring about negative 
results in the form of people being dissatisfied that their life is overly 
governed by the law.  Another important effect of different types of laws, 
however, is the effect that the certainty (or uncertainty) of what precisely the 
law allows or forbids will have on people.  This will now be discussed in 
more detail.   
Up until now, various possible substantive accounts of tort law have been 
considered.  On one end of the spectrum, we have considered possible tort 
laws that say merely “One will be held liable in tort if one does not act 
efficiently (i.e., in a manner that maximizes society’s happiness).”  We have 
also considered the possibility of the law being defined in terms of 
efficiency, but allowing parties a realm of selfishness that does not trigger 
liability—defined either in terms of the domain or type of action, or perhaps 
in terms of the percent above one’s percentage of the world population that 
one is allowed to weight one’s own welfare.184  We have also considered 
murky corrective justice notions of wrongful behavior as potential standards 
of liability, and these laws could be stated at a high level of generality or also 
with great precision and specificity.185  
There can be great benefits to laws that are vague standards such as “One 
will be held liable in tort if one does not act efficiently,” as opposed to 
precise rules such as “One will be held liable in tort if one steals the property 
of another person.”  For one, if the vague law is stated to track what we do 
intrinsically care about—e.g. people’s happiness—it will be more tailored to 
what we care about than more precise statements of the law that serve as 
mere proxies for what we do care about (as in the case of the law against 
theft, which on the whole—but not in every instance—will be a happiness 
                                                
184  See supra Parts IV and V. 
185  Id.  
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maximizing law to have).  Thus, there is a benefit to laws that take the form 
of vague standards.    
This notwithstanding, there can also be high costs associated with laws 
taking the form of vague standards.  There will often be uncertainty about 
what precisely will be found to conform with the law and what will be found 
to violate it.  Different factors are present in different cases, but the 
uncertainty can exist for various reasons.  For one, there can be uncertainty 
about what a judge or jury’s findings will be.  This factor itself can be broken 
into more than one factor: First, one might not know what the findings of fact 
will be.  This will often depend on what evidence is available and admissible.  
Second, there can be uncertainty about what a judge or jury’s findings will be 
with respect to more subjective matters such as what assumptions, 
inferences, or predictions are or were reasonable given the circumstances.   
Another factor contributing to potential uncertainty is not uncertainty 
about what will happen in court, but rather, uncertainty regarding the actual 
facts of particular situations when one acts (e.g., would it be a happiness 
maximizing event to drive to the store now to buy what I desire, despite the 
weather conditions and some concerns about my car’s brakes?).  Uncertainty 
about what the law is will (in almost all conceivable cases) be inefficient.  It 
will lead to stress, anxiety, and unhappiness, and the lack of a clear rule will 
often chill investments or other commercial behavior that seeks predictable 
conditions and results.   
Thus, in light of potential benefits and costs of having the law be 
comprised more of precise rules and more of vague standards, the question is 
what the optimal law would look like.  Empirical questions abound regarding 
which areas of the law would be best handled with rules or with standards.  
This notwithstanding, however, there is reason to think that our current tort 
system might be at a fairly happy medium.  The letter of the law itself uses 
vague terms,186 but, at least in most areas of the law, there is robust precedent 
that makes it so that we, by and large, have great certainty regarding what is 
tortious and what is not.187  
It is important to note, though, that although the paradigm case of a 
vague law that has been discussed has been “You will be held liable if you do 
not do what is efficient,”188 and the paradigm case of a precise rule has been 
“You will be held liable if you vandalize a person’s car in his or her 
driveway,”189 it is not the case that the efficiency standard necessarily 
correlates with vagueness or that a murky corrective justice substantive 
notion correlates with precise rules.  These two concerns are orthogonal to 
one another, and it should not be inferred that they are related.  The 
                                                
186  Consider, for example, the “reasonable person” standard. 
187  Consider, for example, all cases that determine whether a particular action is 
one that would have been carried out by a “reasonable person.” 
188  See supra Parts III, IV, and V. 
189  Id. 




efficiency standard could be formulated with precise rules and the rights-
based notion could be formulated with vague standards.   
The point here is simply that in addition to assessing the backward-
looking aspects of the law, and the forward-looking aspects of the law that 
are due to incentive effects, it is also important to take into consideration the 
forward-looking effects of the law that are not due to incentive effects.  
Uncertainty is one of a number of factors of this sort that must be included in 
the calculus assessing a government or legal system on the whole.  It is a 
highly salient one, though, and one that must not be underestimated.   
  
 VI. THE SIMILARITY OF COMMON LAW AND STATUTORY LAW 
 
A question might arise, at this point, as to whether the fact that tort law is 
part of the common law (i.e., judge-made law), as opposed to statutory law, 
is of any relevance to the debate about the compatibility between its forward-
looking and backward-looking aspects, and if so, what the relevance is.  
After all, prima facie, there seems to be a relevant difference: In a statutory 
system, the legislator and the judge are two separate offices, but in common 
law areas—such as tort—there is no separate office for a legislator.  Rather, 
it seems that a judge plays both roles.  Furthermore, it seems that the debate 
about forward-looking and backward-looking aspects of tort law gets off the 
ground precisely because when a common law judge takes one action (i.e., 
makes a decision), the action has two types of effects—forward-looking 
effects and backward-looking effects.  This phenomenon seems to be what 
gives rise to the questions, at issue in this Article, of what the judge’s role is 
and should be in a tort case.   
Despite the fact that the forward-looking / backward-looking debate 
ostensibly arises in the context of the common law, it is a mistake, on 
reflection, for one to hold this view.  To begin with, at the stage of 
legislation, similar questions arise in the case of statutory law.  The legislator 
is confronted with the question of whether the law that will bring about the 
best forward-looking results (due to incentive effects) is also the law that will 
bring about backward-looking value, and, if one thinks that they diverge, 
whether it is more important to pass the law that furthers forward-looking 
value or the one that furthers backward-looking value.  Further, it seems that 
the considerations in this context are akin to those this Article discussed 
when it argued, in Part III, that given a fixed substantive notion, forward-
looking and backward-looking accounts are coextensive.  Similarly the case 
here: It seems that laws passed will be both intrinsically forward-looking and 
intrinsically backward-looking and simultaneously further both goals.190   
                                                
190  It might occur to the reader that perhaps a counterexample to this 
coextensiveness claim in the context of statutory legislation might be laws similar in 
structure to the Rockefeller drug laws (a system of drug laws with extremely severe 
penalties).  Although there was no shortage of debate about the pros and cons of 
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How about at the stage of a judge applying statutory law to the facts of 
the case and litigants before him?  If the law is clear, then his task is merely 
to apply the clear law to the facts of the case.  If, however, the law is unclear 
or not completely determinate, then the judge will not only need to apply the 
law to the facts, but he will also need to interpret the law to determine what it 
should be understood to say about the facts of the current case.  Statutory 
interpretation is a complex topic of legal theory on its own, and there are 
various theories about how a judge does, could, or should interpret statutes 
when they don’t apply clearly to the facts of a case.  One of the most 
common interpretive strategies, however, is to attempt to determine the intent 
of the legislator, or, more specifically, to determine what the legislator would 
have said regarding the facts of this particular case if he had had the time to 
specifically address these facts, or the foresight to even conceive of these 
facts.  While different theories of statutory interpretation have different 
features, most of them arguably can be boiled down to a similar inquiry into 
what the legislator would say or would have said about these facts.  But, as 
described in the prior paragraph, it seems that when a legislator passes a law, 
he is simultaneously furthering both intrinsically forward-looking and the 
corresponding intrinsically backward-looking values.  Even if he only is 
conscious of one of these two aims, the other goal is simultaneously being 
                                                                                                               
these laws, a common thought was that they had good forward-looking value 
(through increased deterrence) but that they had backward-looking disvalue because 
the quantity of punishment was far in excess of the badness of the crime.  So far, this 
Article has primarily addressed the question of liability and cabined the question of 
the size of the remedy or punishment.  This raises a number of more complex issues, 
but none, it seems, which truly casts doubt on the coextensiveness claim.  
It certainly does seem to be the case, though, that a coextensiveness (or 
compatibility) claim is unable to ignore this quantity of liability issue, and it needs to 
be able to provide an account that handles it.  Forward-looking value is obviously 
hugely affected by the quantity of expected liability, and it is all-important for an 
assessment of backward-looking value as well.  How precisely to provide an account 
of the backward-looking value of different quantities of liability or punishment is 
notoriously difficult, however.  In tort, this is less of a problem than in criminal law, 
because in tort there is a non-arbitrary quantity that is dictated by the loss to the 
plaintiff.  In criminal cases this is generally not the case, and even if it were, any rate 
of exchange between these losses and prison time for the defendant seem arbitrary.   
The questions here regarding the coextensiveness claim in the context of statutory 
legislation and regarding the coextensiveness claim regarding quantities of 
punishment are important and require considerable further treatment.  Suffice it to 
say here, though, that the reason that Rockefeller laws (and similar laws) don’t seem 
to be a counterexample is that there is strong reason to doubt that the forward-
looking value is at all what their proponents thought they were.  Further, many 
further considerations arise here regarding the anxiety that people might have about 
living in a society with these laws.  These considerations relate to those that arose in 
Parts II.B and III.B in the context of Rawls’s discussion.  Additionally, it is far from 
clear exactly what our backward-looking views are in cases of this sort. 




furthered.  Thus, the judge’s inquiry in the case at bar is parasitic on this, and 
thus both forward-looking and backward-looking inquiries would be relevant 
to deciding this case where there is statutory law, but where it is not 
completely determinative.   
Further, although the inquiry is into what the legislator might have seen 
to be of forward-looking or backward-looking value, this question can most 
easily be approached by a judge asking himself what he would have thought 
if in the legislator’s shoes, and relatedly, what he himself—the judge—thinks 
would be of forward-looking or backward-looking value.  As such, the 
judge’s views on what has forward-looking or backward-looking value 
necessarily enter into the inquiry.    
This seems to be an accurate description of statutory legislation and 
adjudication, and of what tort law would be like if it were a statutory—and 
not a common law—regime.  How, if at all, though, do these cases of 
statutory legislation and adjudication differ from cases of common law 
“legislation” and adjudication?  Very little.  In the common law domain, as 
with statutory law, there will be cases for which it is clear how the law 
applies to the facts in the case at bar, and there will be cases where the law is 
not determinate about the facts of the case at bar.  In the cases where the law 
is clear—i.e., where the common law precedent is clear—the judge will be 
bound by stare decisis and will not have the discretion to do anything other 
than apply this law to the current facts.  This is precisely what the judge does 
in the case of statutory law that is clear and determinate in a particular case. 
In common law areas, such as tort, there will also be cases that arise 
where the law is not clear or determinate regarding a particular set of facts.    
Here, the judge will follow a procedure that is very similar to that which he 
would follow in the above-described case where a statute governs but is 
either not clear or is otherwise non-determinate in a particular case.  He will 
ask how those who articulated the (non-determinative) rule would have 
further described the details of the rule and its application in the context of 
the current facts—if they had had time to articulate these specifics, or if they 
had had the foresight to conceive of these facts.  Unlike the case of statutory 
law, however, the controlling (but non-determinate) common law rule will 
not necessarily have been enacted at any one time by any single body, but 
will perhaps have gradually been articulated and filled out by countless 
judges over time.  Just as in the statutory case, however, the articulation of 
the rule over time will have had simultaneous forward-looking and 
backward-looking aspects, and also, just as in the statutory case, the current 
judge’s investigation into these views of those who articulated the rule will 
take as its starting point what the current judge’s views would have been if in 
the shoes of the others, and similarly, what the current judge’s current view 
is.  Though this process in common law is very similar to the process in 
statutory law, the goal of arriving at the intent of those who articulated the 
rule in the common law context will likely be more challenging than the 
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same task in the case of statutory law, and this of course is due to the fact 
that the common law rule will have been articulated by numerous bodies 
over time as opposed to by one legislative act.  The difference in the task 
confronting the current judge in common law, as opposed to in statutory law 
is, however, not a difference in type, but a difference in degree.  It seems 
likely that due to the differences just listed, the current views of the common 
law judge might often play a somewhat larger role in the filling of the 
indeterminacy than would be the case in the statutory inquiry—the latter of 
which would have fewer moving parts and thus might be more of a 
constrained inquiry.   
Thus, it seems that the issues arising in the statutory context and the 
common law context are, contrary to popular belief, very similar and almost 
identical.  Furthermore, it seems that the very slight differences that do arise 
present themselves in the context of cases where the law is non-determinate, 
and while these cases certainly do exist, these constitute the vast minority of 
cases that are filed.  As such, the divergence (with respect to the subject 
matter of our discussion) between statutory law and common law, which was 
already slight, is diminished even further.   
One final clarification is in order: Not only does it seem to be thought 
that forward-looking aspects of laws both can and do diverge from 
backward-looking aspects, but it also seems to be thought that decisions 
made in favor of forward-looking concerns (allegedly) at the expense of 
backward-looking values are not only bringing about a morally unfair result 
for the litigants, but also a legally unfair result for the litigants.  If this were 
the case, this would perhaps add even more unfairness to the already unfair 
result that the litigants are undergoing.  As has been argued throughout this 
Article, these divergences do not seem to exist.  Even if they did, though, and 
thus stipulating that litigants might have a morally unfair result imposed on 
them, it still would not be the case that this litigant “whose rights have been 
sacrificed for the social good” would have failed to get protection from a law 
that covered his case.191  Rather, these alleged cases of backward-looking 
injustice are cases where a precedent is found to be non-determinate when 
applied to the facts of the case at bar.  Thus, a decision that goes against this 
litigant would not be a decision to change a law that covered and protected 
the litigant, but rather, an interpretation and clarification of the law to show 
that, despite what the litigant might have thought, it does not cover his case.  
Thus, contrary to the alleged appearance of such a case, the law is being 
clarified and interpreted, and, strictly speaking, it is not being changed.   
Of course, there could be cases, and there likely are cases, here and there 
where a judge’s argument in support of a particular claim is pretextual, and 
sometimes obviously so.  How prevalent this is is an empirical question, and 
even empirical work here seems unlikely to get at the truth (due to judges 
                                                
191 See, e.g., Part I.B, supra. 




failing to admit their true rationales, or perhaps due to judges not even 
knowing their true operative rationales themselves).  If this phenomenon is 
prevalent in the common law—and especially if, due either to the differences 
between common law and statutory law described above, or due to chance, 
this phenomenon is more prevalent in common law than in statutory law—
this could explain the perception that people have regarding the common law 
and the alleged divergence between forward-looking and backward-looking 
views.  Even if this is in fact the case, though, this is not a function of the law 
itself, but rather, it is a function of the practical problem of judges failing to 




This Article has argued that the long-standing debate between corrective 
justice theorists and economic theorists is filled with confusion and is based 
on a false assumption.  This assumption—which both camps mistakenly 
make—is that forward-looking and backward-looking accounts of tort law 
are not compatible with one another.  Forward-looking and backward-
looking accounts of tort law are, however, compatible with one another, and 
this Article has attempted to explain why this is the case.  This, in part, 
involved explaining how so many other authors have gone wrong.   
Despite there being compatibility between forward-looking and 
backward-looking accounts, it was argued that, as a practical matter, people 
do not subscribe to the same substantive views for both the forward-looking 
and backward-looking aspects of tort law.  This suggests that tort law would 
not simultaneously be able to fully coincide with people’s forward-looking 
and backward-looking views.  Thus, there would seem to be a question of 
whether tort should be an institution that seeks to further forward-looking 
value or backward-looking value, or some mix of the two.  This 
notwithstanding, it was argued that the practical divergence in fact would be 
much smaller than one might think.   
In light of these quasi-descriptive conclusions, the Article then 
undertook an exploration of normative questions, addressing issues such as 
whether or not it is good that this is the way things are, and what we might 
be able to do to improve the situation if the current state of affairs is not 
ideal.  Though the status quo is not bad, the Article argued that we would be 
better off if our substantive notion of wrongfulness were brought into even 
closer alignment with our substantive notion of societal goals.  Further, it 
was argued that it is in fact a possibility to reduce and perhaps even 
eliminate this divergence—thus bringing about not only theoretical, but also 
practical compatibility between forward-looking and backward-looking 
accounts of tort—and practical proposals for how to carry out this 
transformation project were offered.    
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In light of this, the theoretical compatibility claim itself thus turns out to 
be of both instrumental and intrinsic value.  The instrumental importance: If 
it weren’t for its truth, the possibility of bringing about the practical 
convergence that the Article proposes would not even exist.  This 
convergence would be valuable—and thus the theoretical claim is of 
instrumental value.  The intrinsic importance: Even if the above-mentioned 
practical convergence were not possible, it is an important revelation that the 
forward-looking and backward-looking aspects of tort are theoretically 
compatible, because it shows that authors have been grossly mistaken both 
about what precisely is at issue in the debate and about where the action lies 
in tort law theory.   
Thus, now armed with substantially greater clarity, hopefully we can 
reorient our theoretical and practical inquiries so that they are aimed in more 
fruitful directions. 
 
 
